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A GOAT Too FAR?: STATE AUTHORITY TO
TRANSLOCATE SPECIES ON AND OFF (AND
AROUND) FEDERAL LAND
Devin Kenney*
INTRODUCTION
The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") and United States
Forest Service controls wildlife on federal property to the extent that
Congress has so authorized agency intervention Therefore, the agencies
may act to protect endangered species,2 control or prohibit the importation
of certain species determined to be invasive,3 and, in the case of the Forest
-B.A., University of Utah, 2012; J.D., Michigan State University College of Law, 2015. I hardly
know how to begin thanking all those to whom I owe so much. To paraphrase the immortal words of
Laurence Sterne, however, "of all the several ways of beginning [to write] which are now in practice
throughout the known world" the best is to "begin with writing the first sentence-and trusting to
Almighty God for the second." LAURENCE STERNE, THE WORKS OF LAURENCE STERNE 242
(1849).
As I sit down to work, I realize that there are so many people to whom I owe thanks, so many
more than I could ever hope to include in here. That said, I will do my best. I want to thank principally
my Heavenly Father for giving me the opportunity to research and write this paper. I have been blessed
with innumerable opportunities in my life and to Him I owe my all. Next, I must thank my wife Traci
and kids, Lincoln and Quinn. Through the sleepless nights and days I spent working on this article,
they have been my rocks. Without them, nothing I accomplish has any meaning.
I must also thank particularly Professor Noga Morag-Levine. She was a mentor throughout my
law school career and a major guide in the writing of this paper. Without her input, I am not sure that
this paper would have evolved beyond the hot mess it began as. Additionally, I must thank Mr. Martin
Bushman and Greg Hansen of the Utah Attorney General's Office. They placed their trust in me and I
hope that this-the end product of our collaboration--does not disappoint. Thank you!
' For example, both the Forest Service and BLM are authorized to manage the habitat, but not
the wildlife itself. 36 C.F.R. § 293.10 (2015); 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(d) (2015). Both the Secretary of
Agriculture and Secretary of Interior are authorized to close certain areas to fishing and hunting "for
reasons of public safety, administration, or compliance with provisions of applicable law." Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2015) [hereinafter FLPMA]. Even under these
circumstances, however, "any regulations of the Secretary concerned relating to hunting and fishing
pursuant to this section shall be put into effect only after consultation with the appropriate State fish
and game department." Id. On the other hand, whereas the Forest Service's polices are at least
ambiguous, BLM policies explicitly prohibit the introduction of non-native species. See infra Part
I.C.i.2.
2 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
See, e.g., Hawaii Tropical Forest Recovery Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4502a(a)(3)-(4) (2012) (authorizing
the Forest Service to "protect indigenous plant and animal species and essential watersheds from non-
native animals, plants, and pathogens [and] establish biological control agents for non-native species
that threaten natural ecosystems."); Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. § 42(a) (2012) (prohibiting a list of specific
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Service, kill or otherwise remove wildlife threatening the destruction of
federal property.4 This last power, the power to protect managed land from
destruction, is analogous to the private right of a landowner to destroy
wildlife that threaten his or her private property.' To the extent Congress
has granted unto the executive agencies this power, the authorization is
limited. Like the private right mentioned,6 the grant of power is limited to
the specific terms identified in the authorization-for example, wildlife
that destroy or threaten to destroy federal property-and may not be
expanded beyond the specific statutory authorization.7 As the Supreme
Court concluded in 1976, although Congress may preempt state authority
on federal land, each state exercises plenary authority over wildlife unless
Congress has actually done so.'
Through regulation and policy, however, both the BLM and the
Forest Service have created inroads on state authority in the context of
wilderness areas, WSAs, and research natural areas ("RNAs") beyond
those authorized statutorily.9 The Organic Acts,1" and other land
animal species and authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to enforce the act). That the Lacey Act
explicitly criminalizes the introduction of enumerated species further suggests the need for
Congressional action. Id.
4 Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1928). In this instance, the Department of
Agriculture was acting pursuant o a Congressional mandate to "preserve the forest... from
destruction." U. S. v. Hunt, 19 F.2d 634,636 (D. Ariz. 1927), affd, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
5 Compare Hunt, 278 U.S. at 100 (noting that the Secretary's action was "necessary to protect the
lands of the United States from serious injury"), withJ.C. Vance, Right to Kill Game in Defense of
Property, 21 A.L.R.2d 1366. Although today this right is strictly limited in many States, see, e.g., Utah
Code Ann. § 23-16-2 (2015), the consensus in the early twentieth century favored the right of the
landowner to protect his or her property. J.C. Vance, Right to Kill Game in Defense of Property, 21
A.L.R.2d 1366 (in which a statute prohibiting the killing of elk when done so to prevent destruction of
property owned by the person doing the killing was unconstitutional and in violation of the provisions
of the Montana Constitution guaranteeing to all persons the right... to defend... [their] property).
At the time, courts were inclined to find that preventing a property owner from protecting his or her
property infringed the person's property right. Id.
Moreover, although Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) cast the state's claim to title
as "lean[ing] upon a slender reed,", the Supreme Court reaffirmed just four years after Holland and four
years prior to Hunt that "[tihe wild animals within [a State's] borders are, so far as capable of
ownership, owned by the state in its sovereign capacity for the common benefit of all of its people."
Lacoste v, Dep't of Conservation of State of La., 263 U.S. 545, 549 (1920). "Because of such ownership
... the state may regulate the taking..." Id.
6 Hunt, 278 U.S. at 100.
7 Hunt, 19 F.2d at 640-41.
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542-43 (1976); see Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
337 (1979); Lacoste v. Dep't of Conservation of State of La., 263 U.S. 545, 549 (1920).
9 See 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(d). The BLM's organic act permits the Secretary of the Interior to restrict
of hunting and fishing "for reasons of public safety, administration, or compliance with provisions of
applicable law." 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). Except to the extent that BLM's non-native species policy must
rely upon these limited restrictions in order to be valid, these exceptions are not relevant here. See also
36 C.F.R. § 251.23 (authorizing "[tihe Chief of the Forest Service [to]... establish a series of research
natural areas").
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management statutes" of the various federal and management agencies,
also recognize and preserve state wildlife management authority-as that
authority existed in 1976.12 Despite federal encroachment, the
translocation power remains an essential element of state authority.3 Since
the Forest Service and BLM lack Congressional authorization to preempt
state law 4 as to the translocation of species on the public lands either
agency manages,5 a state may exercise that authority to introduce any
animal, native or non-native,6 on any BLM or Forest Service land where
the state has wildlife management authority.
17
At its heart, the power struggle centers less in the wildlife management
conflict 8 and more in the fundamental conflict and understanding of that
conflict between overlapping federal and state government.9 The
resolution of this dispute is, therefore, much more important and fraught
than a few goats in the mountains.21 Most of the Western states are home
to very large tracts of federal land, which are home to a large portion of the
" An 'organic act" or "organic statute" is a law that establishes an administrative agency or local
government. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1634 (9th ed. 2014). In this context, it is an act of the
United States Congress that creates an administrative agency to manage certain federal lands, or
consolidates management authorities found in various statutory sections into a single act. For the
relevant portion of the Organic Acts creating the Forest Service and BLM, see 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012)
(declaring that State Fish & Wildlife Agencies retain jurisdiction over wildlife in National Forests); 43
U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012) (stating the same in regard to BLM-managed land).
11 See, e.g, The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7) (2012) (stating that "[n ] othing in
this chapter shall be construed as affecting thejurisdiction or responsibilities of the several States with
respect to wildlife and fish in the national forests.").
12 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012) (stating that "[n]othing herein shall be construed as affecting
the jurisdiction or responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish on the national
forests."); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012) (stating that "[nothing in this Act shall be construed as...
enlarging or diminishing the responsibility and authority of the States for management offish and
resident wildlife.").
13 See infta Part I.B.iii.
14 See infra Part I.C.i.
15 See 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7) (2012); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).
" This holds true unless that particular animal species is considered invasive and controlled
under a legitimate Congressional grant of authority regulating invasive species. For a list of such federal
laws and regulations in addition to a brief summary of the relevant powers Congress delegated pursuant
to each. See United States Dep't of Agric., FederalLaws and Regulations: Public Laws andActs, NAT'L
INVASIVE SPECIES INFO. CENTER (Aug. 26,2014),
http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/laws/publiclaws.shtml.
"7 See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976) (explaining that in the absence of
contrary federal law regarding wildlife on federal land, "the States have broad trustee and police powers
over wild animals within their jurisdictions").
" See Christian Gamborg et al., Ethics of Wildife Management and Conservation: What Should We
Try to Protect?, 3 NATURE EDUC. KNOWLEDGE 8 (2012).
"9 See infra Subsection III.
2o Dylan Brown, In Utah Land-Use Fight, 18 Goats Become Unlikely Stars, ENVTL. & ENERGY
PUBLISHING (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060005159.
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wildlife managed by the states.21 To the extent that federal agencies like
BLM and the Forest Service have the authority to unilaterally exclude non-
native game species from the lands they manage, there is the justifiable
concern that these agencies might act to limit the state wildlife manager's
authority to carry out its other management activities, impacting outdoor
recreational opportunities and revenues generated from the utilization of
those opportunities.22
Part I of this article compares and contrasts the history of public land
management in the United States with the related history of the
management of public wildlife resources. Part II discusses whether the
BLM or the Forest Service have legal authority to preempt or subordinate
state wildlife management decisions on transplanting and releasing native
or non-native wildlife on their respective lands, including Wilderness
Areas, WSAs, and RNAs, and considers more specifically whether the
BLM or the Forest Service has the authority to enjoin state translocation
projects that release wildlife on federal lands or non-federal lands adjacent
to federal lands. Additionally, Part III considers whether the existing
permitting and regulatory regime established by BLM and the Forest
Service applies to the several States in the same fashion as it applies to
private individuals.
Part IV evaluates the claim that the National Environmental
Protection Act ("NEPA") is violated where the relevant federal land
management agency fails to prevent state-authorized wildlife translocation,
and subsequently fails to remove the species from federal lands. Part V
briefly evaluates the limitations, or lack thereof, of the tools available to the
States in undertaking wildlife management projects without obtaining
21 This is no small issue. For example, in Utah alone over 1 million acres of land are designated
wilderness managed either by the BLM or the Forest Service is located in Utah alone. See Utah
Wilderness Study Areas,UTAH.COM, http://www.utah.com/playgrounds/designated-wilderness.htm
(last visited Dec. 31, 2015) (In Utah over t million acres of land are managed by the BLM or the Forest
Service); see also WSA Maps, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
http://www.blm.gov/ut/stlen/prog/blm-special-areas/wlderness-study-areasfWSA- Maps.html (last
visited Dec. 31, 2015) (the BLM manages 87 WSAs within Utah); Carol Hardy Vincent et al, Federal
Land Ownership: Overview and Data, FEDERATION OFAMERICAN SCiENTISTS (Feb. 8, 2012),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf (In Utah, the BLM manages approximately 22,854,937
acres, the Forest Service manages an additional 8,207,415 acres).
' With such a large percentage of the state under federal land management authority, exercising
management authority over habitat as a disguise for exercising management authority over wildlife
would be a substantial infringement on state wildlife management authority and could substantially
impair DWR's ability to effectively manage wildlife populations and serve Utah's citizens. Ernest R.
Perkins et al., Western Association ofFish & Wildlife Agencies, White Paper:. Willife Management
Subsidiary, WAFWA Uune 2011),
http://www.wafwa.org/Documents%20and%2OSettings/37/Site%20Documents/Commtvees/Commi
ssioners/CommitteeDocuments.pdf ( escribing how federal overreach complicates State management
of wildlife).
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prior federal approval. Part VI concludes by reaffirming state authority to
manage wildlife in the absence of Congressional abrogation of that
authority. Part VI also concludes that apparently Forest Service and BLM
regulations do not apply to the states, are contrary to governing statutes as
applied to the states, and exceed statutory and regulatory authority as
applied.
I. BACKGROUND
By a quirk of history, the management of federal land itself is governed
differently than the wildlife residing thereon.23 Federal agencies like the
Forest Service and BLM, but also the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,
National Park Service, and Department of Defense, manage the land, or
the habitat, of wildlife.24 The federal government adopted this land
management policy after nearly a century of relative disinterest by the
States and private parties in the remaining federal lands." Even as this shift
occurred, Congress was careful to preserve the status quo of state
management with regard to wildlife management authority.26
The management of wildlife remains, therefore, as it traditionally has;
reserved to the states, even on federal lands.2 7 Congress may exercise its
plenary power over federal property to preempt state management.2"
Where Congress has not explicitly done so, or has acted instead to reserve
this power to the states,29 state management authority of wildlife is limited
23 See infra Part I.A-B.
See 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(d) (2015) (stating that the states possess primary authority and
responsibility for management offish and wild life, whereas the Federal government manages the
habitat); see also 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(c) (2015) (recognizing that although BLM is charged with the
management of lands for fish and wildlife conservation, State fish and wildlife agencies exercise "the
primary authority and responsibility... for management offish and resident wildlife on such lands");
36 C.F.R. § 293.10 (2015) (in accord with the Forest Service).
2' See, e.g., COMM'R OF THE GEN. LAND OFFICE, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE 7 (1875) available at
http://babel.hathitust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112101709688;page=root;view=image;size=100;seq=
7
(describing disinterest by settlers in desert lands as having stymied the effectiveness of the available land
grants in the then-existing States and Territories of the United States).
- 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012) (stating that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as ....
enlarging or diminishing the responsibility and authority of the States for management offish and
resident wildlife.").
7 Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214,1226-27 (10th Cir. 2002).
s Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540-41 (1976) (stating that "[allthough the Property
Clause does not authorize an exercise of a general control over public policy in a State, it does permit an
exercise of the complete power which Congress has over particular public property entrusted to it. In
our view, the 'complete power' that Congress has over public lands necessarily includes the power to
regulate and protect he wildlife living there.").
2 Congress has done so on numerous occasions. See 16 U.S.C. § 528; 16 U.S.C.
§ 1133(d)(7)(2012); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b)(2012).
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only to the extent that the exercise of that authority conflicts with the
lawfully established authority of the respective federal agency established
by Congress and charged with managing that particular segment of federal
land or that particular activity.3" Finally, the state is charged with managing
wildlife as a public trust for all of its citizens.31
A. Land Management
The contrasting approaches between wildlife and habitat management
(collectively referred to as land management) are a product of history,
tradition, and the underlying statutory schema superimposed upon the
federal land management agencies by Congress.2 The American schema of
land management began as little more than a blanket policy of disposal.3
In the American West, however, federal settlement programs never really
"took off,"34 allowing for a gradual federal policy shift towards retention
and protection of existing federal property.
35
30 See, e.g., Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 99 (1928); UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-13-3 (West
2015).
"' Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519,529-30(1896).
32 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(d) (2015) (indicating the states possess primary authority and responsibility
for management of fish and wild life, whereas the Federal government manages the habitat); see infra
Part I.B (summarizing of the history and tradition behind State approaches to wildlife management).
"3 See Robert Barrett, History on an Equal Footing: Ownership of the Western Lands, 68 U. COLO.
L. REV. 761 (1997); see also Ordinance of the Northywest Territory, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 659,663 (2004);
see Paul Wallace Gates & Robert W. Swenson, History of Public LandLaw Development, PUBLIC LAND
LAW REVIEW COMM'N, (1968), available at http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdmL/ref/collection/wwdl-
doc/id/5226.
Even so, these programs were always controversial. For example, in 1828, Governor Ninian
Edwards of Illinois "maintained that the Constitution gave the federal government no power to exercise
control over the public lands in a state after its admission to the Union." Id. Within thirty years, after
various land grants and years of land sales, "virtually all the public lands were gone" in Illinois. Id. at 18.
' Some thirteen years after the passage of the Homestead Act of 1862, which was intended to
facilitate the settlement of the West, the Commissioner of the General Land Office wrote that, "it may
be safely affirmed that, except in the immediate valleys of the mountain streams, where by dint of
individual effort water may be diverted for irrigating purposes, title to the public lands cannot be
honestly acquired under the homestead laws." COMM'R OF THE GEN. LAND OFFICE, supra note 25.
Whereas much of the land East of the Mississippi was suitable for farming or agricultural production,
the arid, mountainous regions of the West proved much less attractive, leading the Secretary of the
Interior to describe this land in 1946 as "the land which nobody wanted very much, the land without
people." U.S. DEPT OF INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 29
(1946). See also E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: DISPOSAL AND
RESERVATION POLICIES, 1900-1950 3 (1951). This land was of such a quality that "[w]ithout water,
most of what remained could never be expected to furnish arable farms." Id.
" In 1897, during debate on what became the Forest Service Organic Act, Representative
McRae (D-Ark.) presciently declared.
"The purpose of [this Act] is the protection of our forests; and let me tell
you that in less than fifty years from today, unless a change is made, you will find
that the condition of the country which is today being denuded of its forests...
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The ultimate product of this effort was the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA"), which embodied this shift.36 Thus,
since 1976, land policy has sharply shifted toward retention of public lands
and management for multiple uses, including recreation.7 The Supreme
Court, in reviewing these changes in management policy and structure
under the property clause of the United States Constitution,3 ' determined
that Congress has sweeping authority to regulate the federal lands as it sees
fit. 39 Congress has chosen to do so, however, by limiting agency authority
so as to prevent public access to public lands for only a small subset of
particular reasons.
40
B. Wildlife Management
In deference to longstanding state authority on the subject,4 1 and
perhaps due in part to the federal government's perceived inadequacy in
managing the situation on the ground throughout its extensive land
will present a condition of affairs which will come home to many of you with
force and power.
We want to protect our forests... If the land is not fit for homesteads-
and I assume that much of it is not, or it would have been taken up years ago;
indeed it is admitted that it is not-what better use can we put it than to place it
in a timber reservation?"
30 CONG. REC. 969 (1897) (statement of Rep. Thomas McRae). Arguably, this shift began,
however, during the early 1870s with the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872. FederalLand
Policy and ManagementAct (FLPALI) of 1976: How the Stage Was Setfor BLM's "OrganicAct, U.S.
BUREAU LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/flpma/organic.htm (last visited Oct. 17,2013).
However, it was not until the passage of FLPMA in 1976 that "Congress expressly declared as policy
that the remaining public domain lands would be retained in federal ownership unless disposal of a
particular parcel served the national interest." Id.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012) ("Congressional declaration of policy"). Among other things, this
Act created the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and assigned to it the duty to manage most
federal land. Id. § 1731(a)-(b) (creating the Bureau of Land Management and assigning it the duty to
administer FLPMA).37 
Arguably, this shift began as early as the early 1870s with the creation of Yellowstone National
Park in 1872. Federal Land Policy and Management Ad (FLPMA) of1976: How the Stage Was Setfor
BLM's "OrganicAct, U.S. BUREAU LAND MGMT., http://www.bln.gov/flpma/organic.htn (last
visited Oct. 17, 2013). However, it was not until the passage of FLPMA in 1976 that "[Clongress
expressly declared as policy that the remaining public domain lands would be retained in federal
ownership unless disposal of a particular parcel served the national interest." Id.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, c. 2.
9 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,539 (1976).
o 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).
Klejpe, 426 U.S. at 545; 122 Cong. Rec. 34,373 (1976) (stating that "-[t]raditionally, the
States have regulated fishing and hunting of resident species of wildlife. The BLM and the Forest
Service ... have focused on management of their habitat. This bill does nothingto change that.")
(emphasis added). Indeed, the legislative history suggests that Congress was concerned not with the
translocation or introduction of species, but rather with unregulated hunting of species whose numbers
were much reduced. Id.; see infa Subsection I.B.ii.
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holdings,42 the shift in land management policy did not entail a
commensurate shift in wildlife management authority." Since the
American legal doctrines upon which wildlife management is based are
derived from Roman and English Law, a brief review of each follows."
1. History: Law of Capture, Early English and Roman Law
Both Roman and English Law recognized ultimate state ownership
and control of wildlife." In ancient Rome, wildlife was considered res
nullius, or a "thing owned by no one."' Once captured, however, the
person capturing became owner of the wild animal, even if it was taken on
the land of another.4 7 Even so, wild animals "belonged 'in common to all
citizens of the state,'48 meaning that the State had the authority to regulate
taking.49
In England, wildlife similarly belonged to the sovereign-first the
king, and later parliament, who exercised exclusive authority to regulate
hunting.0 In this environment, regulations were based on a "post-
wilderness" conception of society and hunting privileges were disbursed for
the purpose of maintaining feudal hierarchy." Historically, European
aristocracy held a monopoly on hunting.2 For example, both the king and
42 PuB. LAND LAW REV. COMM'N, ONETHIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORTTO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION 4 (1970).
During the first one hundred years of the Nation's existence, the federal government practiced what
was, in effect, a "no-management policy" that "naturally led to multiple use of the federal lands as
grazing, timber, and mineral interests each attempted to maximize their harvest of targeted resources."
Scott W. Hardt, Federal Land Management in the Twenty-First Century: From Wise Use to Wise
Stewardship, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 345,352 (1994). This allowed" individual and corporate
trespassers [to] effectively exploit[] th[e]se lands" with impunity, even as the General Land Office
recognized the threatened destruction of public lands, it remained powerless to stop them because it
had such few resources available. Id. at 352 n.37.
43 This is most apparent within FLPMA itself. 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (2012) ("[Nlothing in this Act
shall be construed as ... enlarging or diminishing the responsibility and authority of the States for
management of fish and resident wildlife [on federal land].").
See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-28 (1896).
"Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American
Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 677-84 (2005).
6 Id. at 677.
17 Id. at 678.
4' Deborah G. Musiker, Tom France & Lisa A. Hallenbeck, The Public Trust and Parens Patriae
Doctrines: Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 87, 92 (1995).
" Although the Roman State possessed this power, the Roman State rarely utilized it. Blumm &
Ritchie, supra note 45, at 678.
"' In principle, the king and parliament managed wildlife for the common interest, but in
practice, the allotment of hunting privileges heavily favored elites. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 45, at
683-84.
st Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 45, at 686.
2In Europe generally, "kings and aristocrats... restrict[ed] hunting to a very narrow social
stratum... [as a result] [miost of the social history of hunting revolves around the justifications for and
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parliament allowed wealthy nobles to hunt, but excluded the common
people from hunting."
2. American Experiencefrom the Founding to the Early Modern Era
Early American decisions reaffirmed the English and Roman law of
capture,4 but gradually expanded the rights of the common people to hunt.
When Europeans immigrated to North America, they found a seemingly
inexhaustible supply of wildlife in the public commons available for taking,
and they were also no longer legally barred from hunting."5 States inherited
the king's authority after the Revolution,6 but were charged by the United
States Supreme Court to manage wildlife in trust for the people.
5 7
One of the greatest contrasts between the English and American
systems of wildlife management is that the American system relies upon
local governing units-the states-to allocate wildlife resources, rather
than a centralized management policy at the national level who favors
elites.5" Initially, this difference led to the explosion of both opportunity
and exploitation in America, 9 thus causing an overharvesting of species-
enforcement of [this] noble monopoly."JOHNTHEBAULT, "HUNTING," EUROPE, 1450 TO 1789:
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EARLY MODERN WORLD (2004), available at
bttp/qwww .encydopedia.com/topiclhunting.aspx.
s Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 45, at 684.
s' Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) ("[Mjere pursuit gave Post no legal right
to the fox, but that he became the property of Pierson, who intercepted and killed him.").
s Seegenerally Carlos A. Peres, Overexploitation, CONSERVATION BIOLOGY FOR ALL 107,
(Navjot S. Sodhi & Paul R. Ehrlich eds., 2010),
https://conbio.org/images/content-publications/Chapter6.pdf (discussing the effects that early
European settlers had on the overexploitation of wild species in North America).
s Musiker, France, & Hallenbeck, supra note 48, at 93; see Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S.
367, 410-11 (1846) (explaining the way public land was to be treated following the Colonies' separation
from England).
5
7 Martin, 41 U.S. at 432-433 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (requiring State to hold public lands in
trust for the people such that there was a "common right of fishery" in the trust waters).
ss Note that the aristocratic system in England necessarily kept the eligible pool of hunters very
small. With few members of society eligible, or indeed able, to hunt, the available wildlife resource was
maintained for centuries. See generally ANDERS HALVERSON, AN ENTIRELY SYNTHETIC FISH: How
RAINBOWTROUT BEGUILED AMERICA AND OVERRAN THE WORLD 74-75 (2010) (discussing how
limits imposed on fishing by sportsman dubs benefited the rainbow trout). Given the very different
constraints in the United States, American Fish & Wildlife agencies engage in very proactive
management o maximize the available resource. This duty is carried out in trust for the people of the
State.
51 Between 1800 and 1890 the population of:
-Buffalo dropped from 40 million to several thousand, or less;
-White-Tailed Deer dropped from 24 million to 500,000; and
-Wild Turkey dropped from 15 million to 30,000.
DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE
CRUSADE FOR AMERICA 205 (2009). The population of other key species-such as Pronghorn
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many to scarcity, and some even to extinction. ° Public recognition of this
dramatic decline in wildlife populations sparked the conservation
movement.6' Figures like President Theodore Roosevelt and
conservationist Aldo Leopold "envisioned a nation where all citizens had
an opportunity to engage in conservation and hunting."
62
President Roosevelt,63 having grown concerned after witnessing
firsthand the dramatic decline in North American "big game" species,
founded the Boone and Crockett Club in January 1888.64 The Club's first
efforts were to promote the idea of a "fair chase" doctrine in hunting, and
to create wilderness preserves to protect "buffalo, antelope, mountain
goats, elk, and deer."" To this end, the Club pursued federal legislation
protecting wildlife in the National Park System, in part, explaining the
control the National Park Service exercises in wildlife management as
compared to other federal land management agencies.66
The Club, which remains active today, pioneered the framework that
has developed into the current wildlife management scheme in the United
Antelope and Elk-fell about 98 percent from their levels at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
Id. at 206.
o Take, for example, the rapid extinguishment of the passenger pigeon between 1871 and 1914.
During this period, the pigeon population plummeted from an estimated "hundreds of millions (or
even billions)" to one, and then none. Barry Yeoman, WHy the Passenger Pigeon Went Extinct,
AUDUBON MAG. (May-June 2014), available at
http://www.audubonmagazine.org/artides/birds/why-passenger-pigeon-went-extinct.
6 Id. (noting that the modern conservation movement began in partial response to the extinction
of the passenger pigeon).
62JOHN ORGAN ET AL., WILDLIFE SOCIETY & BOONE CROCKETI CLUB, TECHNICAL
REVIEW NO. 12-04, THE NORTH AMERICAN MODEL OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION 23 (2012),
available at http://www.emwh.org/pdf/conservation/North American Model of Wildlife
Conservation.pdf [hereinafter TECHNICAL REVIEW].
6 Interestingly enough, President Roosevelt's uncle Robert was a prominent member of the
American Acclimatization Society--a group devoted to the translocation of "exotic species'"-who
advocated on behalf of the introduction of Rainbow Trout into the waters of New York State. American
Acclimatization Society, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1877. This doubly interesting because Robert Roosevelt
is credited as a key inspiration for young Theodore's interest in nature and conservation. BRINKLEY,
supra note 59, at 80 ("[Robert Roosevelt], more than any other direct influence, turned Theodore
Roosevelt into a conservationist as a teenager.").
6 BRINKLEY, supra note 59, at 201-07.
65 Id. at 201. "[A] man who wastefully destroys big game, whether for the market, or only for the
heads, has nothing of the true sportsman about him." Id. at 207.
Id. at 201,205-06 (noting that the Club became "the most important lobbying group to
promote all national parks"). Note, however, that these enhanced restrictions apply almost exclusively
in the nationalparks rather than other lands, such as national monuments, also administered by the
National Park Service. See, e.g., Sleeping Bear Dunes: Hunting, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,,
http://www.nps.gov/sIbe/planyourvisit/hunting.htm (last visited May 6, 2015); Glen Canyon: Orange
Cliffs, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/glca/planyourvisit/orange-cliffs.htm (last
visited May 6, 2015) ("Hunting is permitted in Glen Canyon, during hunting season, with proper
license only.").
2015-2016] A GoAT TOO FAR? 313
States. 67 This framework is known as the North American Model of
Wildlife Conservation ("the Model"). 6' The Model groups and restates
several wildlife conservation principles that U.S. jurisdictions have applied
over the past century to develop successful programs for wildlife
management.69 The Model is composed of seven "pillars," they are: (1)
wildlife as a public trust resource, (2) the elimination of markets for game,
(3) allocation of wildlife by law, (4) kill only for legitimate purpose, (5)
wildlife as an international resource, (6) science-based wildlife policy, and
(7) democracy of hunting.70 These seven pillars are used as a "means to
understand, evaluate, and celebrate how conservation has been achieved in
the U.S. and Canada, and to assess whether we are prepared to address
challenges that lay ahead."71 Three of these pillars are implicated in the
mountain goat debate: Wildlife as a Public Trust Resource, Scientific
Management,72 and the Democracy of Hunting.
73
3. States Manage Wildlife as a Public Trust Resource According to
Wildlife Policy Based on Science, Not Supposition or Emotion
At the most basic level, state authority to manage wildlife rests on this
principle: wildlife cannot be privately owned.74 Therefore, States manage
wildlife on behalf of their citizens.7' Although the United States Congress
may have determined that certain wildlife management practices, such as
the preservation of endangered species, is to be better managed at the
67 For example, "[o]n a hunt... members were absolute equals." BRINKLEY, supra note 59, at
204. This echoes the democratic principles enshrined by the North American Model of Wildlife
Conservation. See infra Part I.B.ii.2.
" Valerius Geist, John Organ & Shane Mahoney, Born in the Hands of Hunters: the North
American Model of Wildife Conservation, WILDLIFE PROFESSIONAL 22, 25-27 (2010),
http://www.odwc.state.ok.us/aboutodwc/Born in the Hands of Hunters[6].pdf. But see Michael P.
Nelson, John A. Vucetich, Paul C. Paquet, &Joseph K. Bump, An Inadequate Construct? North
American Model What's Flawed, What's Missing, What's Needed, THE WILDLIFE PROFESSIONAL, 58
(Summer 2013), available at http://www.isleroyalewolf.org/sites/default/files/Nelson et al 2011-An
Inadequate Construct.pdf (questioning the ethic and history behind the North American Model).
69 See generally Geist et al., supra note 68, at 25-27.
mid.
71 Id. at viii.
' This includes insuring that any decisions are made based on actual science, rather than
baseless upposition. UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., UTAH MOUNTAIN GOAT STATEWIDE
MANAGEMENT PLAN 5 (2013), available at
https-J/wildlife.utah.gov/hunting/biggame/pdf/mtn-goat-plan.pdf.
73 Geist et al., supra note 68, at 27.
4 Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367,413-414 (1846) (finding that the State of New
Jersey could not assign the rights to collect shellfish in a particular area to a single individual because the
people exercised the "public and common right of fishery in navigable waters.").
75 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1896); Perkins et al., supra note 22, at 2-3. But see
generally Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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federal level,76 state policymakers are better able to devote the resources
necessary to manage recreational hunting and fishing within their own
territories." Such an approach requires a management policy based on
scientific data, rather than aesthetic or emotive judgments.7 8 This means
that "[s]cience [is the] basis for informed decision-making in wildlife
management."7 9
Through science, good management principles have been discovered
that allow for the "management of diverse species ... under highly complex
circumstances.""° Science guides the range of management options that
wildlife managers should choose from.1 In modern days, it is typical for a
76 16 U.S.C. § 1535(0 (2006) (preempting State laws or regulations in conflict with Endangered
Species Act). Even in the endangered species context, however, State expertise is crucial to facilitate the
management goals of federal agencies. See, e.g., Interagency Policy Regarding the Role of State
Agencies in ESA Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,275, 34275 Uuly 1, 1994) ("In the exercise of their general
governmental powers, States possess broad trustee and police powers over fish, wildlife and plants and
their habitats within their borders. Unless preempted by Federal authority, States possess primary
authority and responsibility for protection and management of fish, wildlife and plants and their
habitats. State agencies often possess cientific data and valuable expertise on the status and
distribution of endangered, threatened and candidate species of wildlife and plants. State agencies,
because of their authorities and their dose working relationships with local governments and
landowners, are in a unique position to assist he Services in implementing all aspects of the
[Endangered Species] Act.").
7' Geist et al., supra note 68, at 26.
7 Past experience has demonstrated that, where this is not the case, the unintended
consequences can be devastating. For example, Gray Wolves were extirpated throughout the
contiguous United States largely based on prejudice. See, e.g., MICHELLE LUTE, HUMAN
DIMENSIONS OF WOLF MANAGEMENT IN MICHIGAN 2 (2013), available at
http://www.michigandnr.com/1FP/wildlife/NRCMatexials/Wolf%20Material/Human%2ODimensio
ns%20of%20Wolf%2OManagement%20in%2OMichigan.pdf ("Wolves were... removed from human-
dominated landscapes out of fear, [and] considered 'evil' and 'gluttonous.'"). Like many other wildlife
management decisions taken with inadequate consideration, the results were both negative and
unexpected. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1989) ("In those days we had never heard
of passing up a chance to ill a wolf.... I was young then, and full of trigger-itch; I thought that because
fewer wolves meant more deer, that no wolves would mean hunters' paradise. But after seeing the green
fire die, I sensed that neither the wolf nor the mountain agreed with such a view. Since then I have lived
to see state after state extirpate its wolves. I have watched the face of many a newly wolfless mountain,
and seen the south-facing slopes wrinkle with a maze of new deer trails. I have seen every edible bush
and seedling browsed, first to anaemic desuetude, and then to death. I have seen every edible tree
defoliated to the height of a saddlehorn. Such a mountain looks as if someone had given God a new
pruning shears, and forbidden Him all other exercise. In the end the starved bones of the hoped-for
deer herd, dead of its own too-much, bleach with the bones of the dead sage, or molder under the high-
lined junipers.") Ironically, this very practice - the elimination of wolves - precipitated the Hunt
decision which is now at the center of the State-federal management debate. See United States v. Hunt,
19 F.2d 634,640 (D. Ariz. 1927).
'9 Geist et al., supra note 68, at 27.
so Id.
' However, "a trend towards greater influence in conservation decision making by political
appointees versus career managers profoundly threatens the goal of science-based management." Id.
Like how the Forest Service reversed itself on the goat issue after facing pressure from the Grand
Canyon Trust. See Letter from Angelita S. Bulletts, Supervisor, Dixie National Forest, to Kevin
Bunnell, Regl Supervisor, Utah Div. of Wildlife Res. (May 3, 2013) (on file with author) ("We support
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policy making board to choose which of those options they believe is in the
best interest of the state, based on a range of concerns, such as economic
impacts, social issues, and concerns for private property rights.8 2 These
decisions are made after holding numerous public meetings and
considering public input.8 3
4. A Democratic Approach to the Management of Wildlife Resources
Through Hunting
In many ways, this final principle is the most important because the
very idea of the public trust presupposes public access to trust resources.
8 4
The basic premise of this final pillar is that every citizen is entitled to the
freedom to hunt and fish." As the Wildlife Society puts it, "[tihe
opportunity for citizens in good standing to hunt in Canada and the U.S. is
a hallmark of our democracy."
86
Today, drawing on that legacy, the United States takes an
internationally uncommon, democratic approach to hunting.7  Its
approach, based on the Model, recognizes the historical universal right of
access to wildlife, which, according to the Boone and Crocket Club, is
considered a right of citizenship in our democratic society.8" Additionally,
this approach recognizes the need to have democratic input into wildlife
management decisions, as well as the states' duty to conserve wildlife so
that citizens will have continuing access to it.89 Such access "fosters
individual stewardship and provides the funding necessary to properly
manage wildlife resources in a sustainable manner."
0
the Mountain Goat Statewide Plan and look forward to continuing to work with you."); see Letter from
Nora Rasure, Reg'l Forester, Intermountain Region, U.S. Forest Serv., to Gregory Sheehan, Exec.
Sec'y, Utah Bd. of Wildlife (Aug. 21, 2013) (on file with author) ('he Forest Service does not support
the proposal at this time .... ."). One has to wonder what in the science changed between May and
August 2013.
" See, e.g., UTAH CODEANN. §§ 23-14-2,3 (2015).
'3 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-14-2.6 (2015); see also Open and Public Meetings Act, tit. 52, ch.
4, Utah Code (West 2016).
'4 Some believe that "the greatest historical meaning of the public trust is that certain interests..
are so intrinsically important that their free availability marks a society as one of citizens rather than
serfs." ORGAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 27.
' The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation, Sportsmen, and the Boone and Crockett Club,
BOONE & CROCKETr CLUB, http://www.boone-
crockett.org/conservation/conservationNAM.asp?area=conservation (last visited Mar. 2013)
[hereinafter BOONE & CROCKEr'r CLUB].
s" Geist et al., supra note 68, at 23.
7 d. at 3.
m BOONE & CROCKET" CLUB, supra note 85.
'9 See id.
90 Id.
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5. What is "Wildlife Management"and Just How Broad Is It?: The
Industry Understanding and Traditional ManagementAuthority
In no case challenging the limits of state and federal authority over
wildlife management has either party challenged whether the activity in
question constituted "wildlife management."91 Instead, the dispute has
been over the extent of state or federal authority vis-i-vis the other.9 2 This
does not mean that the meaning of wildlife management is unimportant.
For example, because FLPMA preserves "the responsibility and authority
of the States for management of fish and resident wildlife,"93 BLM may not
intrude upon state activities that fall within the rubric of "wildlife
management."' Under any reasonable definition of the phrase, wildlife
translocation is "wildlife management."
91 See, e.g., Mich. Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202,206-08 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding
that because National Park Service may prohibit any wildlife management activity by the States that is
not specifically authorized by the organic act of a particular park unit, the National Park Service could
prohibit "trapping" within Pictured Rocks and Sleeping Bear National Lakeshores although "hunting"
was authorized); Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214,1226-27 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that
language of the Act allowed the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to prohibit Wyoming officials from
vaccinating elk on the National Elk Refuge, because the vaccination of elk was not "wildlife
management.").
' See Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1226-27. Again, the dispute of the above cases was over the
boundary between State and federal management authority;, no parties disputed that the activities in
which the States were engaged constituted "wildlife management."
43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).
Greg Yarrow, Fact Sheet 36, CLEMSON Coop. EXTENSION (May 2009),
http://www.demson.edu/extension/natural-resources/wildlife/publications/fs36-wildlife-and wildlife
_management.html ("[Tihere common ideas are present in every definition of wildlife management,
induding- 1) efforts directed toward wild animal populations, 2) relationship of habitat to those wild
animal populations, and 3) manipulations of habitats or populations that are done to meet some
specified human goal."); Statement of Policy, 1J. OF WILDLIFE MGMT. 1, 1-2 (1937). ("Management
along sound biological lines means management according to the needs and capacities of the animals
concerned, as related to the environmental complex in which they are managed. It does not include the
sacrifice of any species for the benefit of others, though it may entail the reduction of competing forms
where research shows this is necessary. It consists largely of enrichment of environment so that there
shall be maximum production of the entire wildlife complex adapted to the managed areas. Wildlife
management is not restricted to game management, though game management is recognized as an
important branch of wildlife management. It embraces the practical ecology of all vertebrates and their
plant and animal associates. While emphasis may often be placed on species of special economic
importance, wildlife management along sound biological lines is also part of the greater movement for
conservation of our entire native fauna and flora.").
" Yarrow, supra note 94. (To translocate a species from one location to another cannot
reasonably be defined as anything other than the "manipulation[] of habitats or populations ... done to
meet some specified human goal."); Gamborg et al, supra note 18 ("The wise use approach aims to
accommodate humanity's continuous use of wild nature as a resource for food, timber, and other raw
materials, as well as for recreation. The idea of wise use appeals to our own best interests, or to the
interests of humans over time, including future people (this approach is often called 'sustainable use').
The goal of management is to enhance and maintain nature's yield as a valuable resource for human
beings.").
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As a traditional power exerted by the States in exercising the authority
to manage wildlife on federal lands, the States impliedly hold the
translocation power to the extent Congress has neither implicitly, nor
explicitly, restricted that authority. This is because the translocation power
is as fundamental and ancient9 6 a power as any, and is central to wildlife
management authority.9 7 As such, Congress must act explicitly to remove
this authority from the states in order to restrict state management
authority.98
Rather than demonstrating the intent to restrict state authority to
manage wildlife on federal land, since Missouri v. Holland, Congress has
repeatedly reaffirmed the principal role of state Fish and Wildlife agencies
in the matter." For example, during the debate leading to the enactment of
the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960,"0 the Act was amended to
include language making explicit that the Act did not affect the jurisdiction
of the states.1 ' The legislative history of the bill makes clear that the Senate
agreed to an amendment introducing this language at the behest of the
House even though "[it] felt that there was no need for this provision"
because the Act was never intended to affect or alter state authority with
respect to wildlife.1"2 Senator Humphrey read into the record a letter urging
the Senate to adopt the amendment "as merely stating what has been
everyone's intent."1 °3
C. Relevant Statutory Authority
Congress has spoken directly to the issue of state management of
wildlife on a number of occasions and has, with few exceptions,"4
' See, e.g., Ether 2:2-3, Book of Mormon ("And they did also lay snares and catch fowls of the
air, and they did also prepare a vessel, in which they did carry with them the fish of waters. And they did
also carry with them .... swarms of bees, and all manner of that which was upon the face of the land,
seeds of every kind."); 1 Nephi 16:11, Book of Mormon ("[W]e did take seed of every kind that we
might carry into the wilderness."); 1 Nephi 18:24, Book of Mormon ("And it came to pass that we did
begin to till the earth, and we began to plant seeds; yea, we did put all our seeds into the earth, which we
had brought from the land ofJerusalem. And it came to pass that they did grow exceedingly, wherefore,
we were blessed in abundance.").
9 See infta Subsection I1I.A.
"Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2002).
Open and Public Meetings Act, tit. 52, ch. 4, Utah Code (West 2016).
"'16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (2012).
'0' 106 Cong. Rec. 12078, 12079 (Senate June 8, 1960).
102 id.
o
3 
Id. at 12085 (S. Humphrey).
Wyoming v. U. S., 279 F.3d 1214, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2002) (interpreting the National
Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act and finding that language of the Act allowed the U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Service to prohibit Wyoming officials from vaccinating elk on the National Elk Refuge); see
also 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2012).
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consistently reaffirmed that federal agencies manage federal land, but state
fish and wildlife agencies manage the wildlife located thereon."'
1. The Scope of the Authority of the Forest Service and Bureau ofLand
Management to Manage Wildlife in Utah
Despite overwhelming Congressional support for continued local
management of wildlife by the States,10 6 Congress may act to explicitly
preempt state management authority through the Property,0 7
Commerce,0 ' Treaty,1" 9 and Necessary and Proper Clauses110 of the United
States Constitution. State control and authority, therefore, is the default
even on federal property unless Congress declares otherwise.m
D. The Forest Service
112
When the Forest Service was created, pursuant to the Forest Service
Organic Act in 1897, Congress could scarcely have imagined that one day
their words would be used to justify limiting and restricting the authority of
the several States to regulate hunting.113 Indeed, at the time the law was
enacted, the leading U.S. Supreme Court opinion on the subject explicitly
recognized state ownership and control of wildlife.114  Perhaps
15s See, e.g., Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012); Wilderness
Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7) (2012); Federal Land Management Policy Act of 1976,43 U.S.C.
§ 1172(b) (2012); Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1333(a) (2012); Fish and
Wildlife Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2909 (2012); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1535
(2012); Sikes Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 670a (2012). For federal regulations espousing the same principle, see
43 C.F.R. § 24.3(b).
1- 16 U.S.C. §§ 528,1133(d)(7) (2012); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).
117 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 544 (1976); Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100
(1928).
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1979).
' Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
'1 5United States v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Fremont Cnty., 145 F.2d 329,330 (10th Cir. 1944)
(holding that States have no authority to frustrate the disposition of federal lands as undertaken by
Congress).
. As late as 2013, 48 states claimed state ownership of wildlife within their borders. See Michael
C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437,1462-64, n. 204
(2013). To the extent State law conflicts with federal statutes regulating federal lands, such law is
preempted. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 544.
112 For a more comprehensive history of the administration of the National Forest System by
USFS, see Hardt, supra note 42, at 351-69.
" 3 The relevant section states, in part, that "[t]he Secretary... shall make provisions for the
protection against destruction by fire and depredations upon the public forests.., and he may make
such rules and regulations and establish such service... to regulate their occupancy and use and to
preserve theforests thereonfiom destruction." Sundry Appropriations Act ofJune 4,1897, 16 U.S.C. §
551 (2012).
114 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529-31 (1896) ('[The power or control lodged in the
state, resulting from ... common ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a
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unsurprisingly then, the 1897 Act said nothing at all about state authority
or jurisdiction-or even wildlife for that matter"5  nor did any member of
Congress during debate on the bill." 6
1. Much Ado About RNAs
Seventy years later, in 1966, the Forest Service promulgated a
regulation authorizing the creation of RNAs,1 7 which relied upon the
destruction-prevention provision of the original Organic Act." 8 As the
history of this rule makes clear, the original regulation was based on a
statute enacted in 18979 that concerned only the authority to prevent
forest fires and damage to the National Forest System.120 According to this
regulation, the Chief of the Forest Service may establish a RNA "to
illustrate adequately or typify for research or educational purposes, the
important forest and range types in each forest region, as well as other plant
communities that have special or unique characteristics of scientific interest
and importance."' Although the RNA program was codified in the Code
trust for the benefit of the people... [T]he state... represents its people, and the ownership is that of
the people in their united sovereignty."), overru/edby Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
11s See 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
16 For an explanation as to the original meaning of the amendment granting the authority to
prevent "destruction" of forest reservations, see 30 Cong. Rec. 912 (1897) (statement of Sen. Stephen
White) ("I might add that it would be a good thing to incorporate in this bill a provision for taking care
of [forest] reservations [i.e. National Forests]. I have seen from my own doorstep during last year, for
three weeks, fires raging within the limits of a forest reservation within which there was no Government
official to do any good and from which everyone who could have protected the flaming forest was by law
exduded."); Id. at 912-13 (statement of Sen. Richard Pettigrew) ("Under existing law these reservations
are withdrawn from settlement, and yet no care is taken to preserve the timber therein. The
consequence is that fires destroy more timber than all the settlers would consume."); see id. at 913
(recommending the amendment that became modem 16 U.S.C. § 551); Id. at 969 (statement of Rep.
Thomas McRae) (expressing need to prevent total destruction of forests). From these statements, it
appears that the term "destruction" was used to refer to forest fires. Impacts related to the presence of
wildlife were not considered.
117 This regulation, and USFS's implementing procedures authorized the imposition of strict
control measures on these particular Forest Service lands. Forest Serv. Manual ch. 4060, § .03
("Research Natural Areas may be used only for Research and Development, study, observation,
monitoring, and those educational activities that do not modify the conditions for which the Research
Natural Area was established."). On the other hand, the Forest Service Manual arguably binds only the
Forest Service and has no power over the State. See infra Subsection l.C.iii (discussing the difference
between legislative and interpretive rules).
"' Experimental Areas and Research Natural Areas, 31 Fed. Reg. 5072, 5072 (Mar. 29, 1966)
(codified at 36 C.F.R § 251.23).
119 Id.
120 See 30 Cong. Rec. 912, supra note 116.
121 Compare 36 C.F.R. § 251.23 (2014), with Experimental Areas and Research Natural Areas,
31 Fed. Reg. 5072, 5072 (Mar. 29, 1966) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 251.23).
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of Federal Regulations in 1966,122 the Forest Service created the first RNA
in the mid-1920s23 This regulation, promulgated first in 1966, remains
entirely unchanged today,124 although the Forest Service now justifies the
restriction through a number of subsequent statutes as well. 21
On its face, the RNA regulation declares that RNAs "will be retained
in a virgin or unmodified condition."126 When taken together with the
Forest Service Manual, it becomes apparent that the Forest Service claims
the authority to manage RNA-designated land to discourage non-native
species and encourage native species.127
2. Permittingfor Use ofNational Forest Land
Forest Service regulations designate most activities conducted on
National Forest System land as "special uses," with a few exceptions.12
These regulations further require that a person obtain a permit before
engaging in any "special use" on Forest Service land.129 With regard to
permitting for hunting and fishing, FLPMA prohibits such a requirement
because it provides that the Secretary of Agriculture may not "require
Federal permits to hunt and fish on public lands or on lands in the National
Forest System."130
122 Whatever the merits of the RNA program, there is no explicit Congressional authorization to
create such a program, nor has Congress provided direct authority to protect the research aspect of the
RNA. Instead, 16 U.S.C. § 551 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to take action to prevent
generalized destruction of National Forest lands. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
"
2
3About RNAs: ANationwide System, UNITED STATES DEPT. OFAGRIC.,
http://www.fs.fed.us/rmrs/research-nanral-areas/about/ (last visited Mar. 12,2014). This was 39 years
prior to the promulgation of the regulation from which the Explanatory parenthetical phrases not
directly quoting the authority usually begin with a present participle. Forest Service claims to derive its
power to so designate National Forest Land. Experimental Areas and Research Natural Areas, 31 Fed.
Reg. 5072, 5072 (Mar. 29, 1966) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 251.23).
'24 See36 C.F.R. § 251.23 (2014).
'2 5Currently, Congress has delegated authority to the Forest Service to act under 36 C.F.R. §
251.23. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 101 l(b) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 472 (2012); 43 U.S.C. § 1740 (2012).
z 36 C.F.R. § 251.23 (2014) (Although there are few cases testing the RNA rule and
restrictions, those that do exist are all private actors suing the federal government over the creation of
RNAs.); see, e.g., Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Jiron, 762 F.3d 1036, 1073 (10th Cir. 2014);
Park Lake Res., LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 378 F.3d 1132 (2004).
"2 Forest Serv. Manual 4063.02(3) (2005) ("The objective[] ofestablishing [a] Research Natural
Area [is] to: ... [p]rotect against human-caused environmental disruptions.').
2 36 C.F.R. § 251.50 (2016).
129 id.
1-0 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2015).
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E. BLM 1'
The BLM, created pursuant to Congressional authorization in
FLPMA during the mid-1970s, "is the largest land manager, public or
private, in the United States . .. manag[ing] approximately 177 million
acres of generally arid or semi-arid public land in the far western states."132
In Utah alone, BLM manages more than a third of the state.3 The BLM's
very existence is a byproduct of the fact that, for the longest time, the lands
now managed by BLM were considered worthless for almost anything at
all." 4 Interestingly enough, however, BLM lands have turned out to be
extraordinarily productive as BLM manages "more fish and wildlife habitat
than any other agency" and lands that "constitute[] a major recreational
resource for millions of Americans."3 5 BLM also has responsibility under
the Wilderness Act to designate lands that demonstrate "wilderness
characteristics" as wilderness study areas, or WSAs.t 6
As described above, the BLM's authority to act is found in FLPMA
137
and the Wilderness Act, which reserve state authority to manage wildlife. 38
The Wilderness Act in § 1133(c) prohibits certain activities in designated
wilderness areas, such as commercial enterprise, permanent or temporary
roads, motor vehicles, motorized equipment, motorboats, mechanical
transport, aircraft landing, installations, and structures.3 9 These are the
only activities prohibited under the Wilderness Act. 4 ° There is no specific
provision restricting state wildlife management authority, and § 1133(d)(7)
specifically reserves to the States jurisdiction over wildlife management.4 '
Furthermore, § (c) provides that its restrictions are subject to exception "as
specifically provided for" in § (d).42 Such an exception suggests, therefore,
that the uses described in subsection (d) of § 1133-including the
"31 For a more comprehensive history of the administration of the public lands managed by
BLM, see Hardt, supra note 42, at 369-71.
" Joseph M. Feller, What is Wrong with the BLMs Management ofLivestock Grazing on the
Public Lands?, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 555, 558 (1994).
133 id.
13Id.
"' Id. at 558-59. In fact, the recreational value of these lands today exceeds the extractive value of
the same land, dollar for dollar.
Id. at 559, 602 n.13; Utah v. Norton, No. 2:96-CV-0870, 2006 WL 2711798, *4-5 (D. Utah
Sept. 20, 2006). (BLM no longer designates new WSAs, pursuant to the settlement agreement created
in this case.)
137 Ile restrictions FLPMA places on BLM are the same as those on the Forest Service under
the same Act. See discussion supra Subsection I.C.i.l.b.
1- 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7) (2014).
139 § 1133(c).
140 id.
141 § 1133(d)(7).
1 § 1133(c).
2015-2016]
322 KY.J. EQUINE, AGRIC. &NAT. RESOURCES L. [VOL.8 No.2
reservation of wildlife management authority to the states-are general
exceptions to the restrictions imposed by § 1133(c), and that the activities
described in § (d) may be carried out or achieved through means otherwise
prohibited in § (c).
14 3
Despite the limited authority granted by these statutes, the language of
the BLM Manual "prohibit[s], to the extent practicable and permitted by
Federal law, the introduction of any non-native species into WSAs." 4 The
Manual further concludes, "the BLM will remove, to the extent practicable
and permitted by Federal law, any non-native fish or wildlife species from
WSAs."145 In addition, the Manual distinguishes between "prohibited"
non-native species and "allowed" non-native species such as non-native
fish "stocked before October 21, 1976""4 and feral horses and burros.47
Thus, it would appear that the phrase "to the extent . . . permitted by
Federal law" would indicate that the BLM recognizes that there are
situations where they do not hold requisite statutory authority to undertake
the actions described in their policy manual.'48
143 See, e.g., § 1133(d) ("The following special provisions are hereby made[.]"); § 1133(d)(1)
(allowing the Secretary of Agriculture to use aircraft for "the control of fire, insects, and diseases" and
directing the Secretary to continue to allow aircraft and motorboats where "these uses have already
become established"); § 1133(d)(5) ("Commercial services may be performed within the wilderness
areas designated by this chapter to the extent necessary for activities which are proper for realizing the
recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas."). Some of these exceptions allow for particular
activities--such as the use of aircraft or motorboats-that are otherwise prohibited, while § 1133(d)(7)
is a very broad grant of authority. Compare § 1133(d)(1) ("Within wilderness areas designated by this
chapter the use of aircraft or motorboats, where these uses have already become established, may be
permitted to continue subject to such restrictions as the Secretary of Agriculture deems desirable."),
with § 1133(d)(7) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or
responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish in the national forests. Nothing in
this chapter shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or responsibilities of the several States with
respect o wildlife and fish in the national forests."). This suggests, at least, that § 1133(d)(7) was
intended as an exception to the restrictions imposed in § 1133(c).
1
44 BuiREAu OF LAND MGMT., BLM MANUAL 6330-MANAGEMENT OF WILDERNESS
STUDY AREAS (PUBLIC) 1-41(2012), availabLe at
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Information ResourcesManagement/policy/blm-manu
al.Par.31915.File.dat/6330.pdf.
145 Id. at 1-42.
146 Id. at 1-41. October 21, 1976 was the effective date of FLPMA. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(3)
(2012).
141 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 144, at 1-38 ("[Nlothing in this section applies to
Wild Horses and Burros. . .
148id.
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1. The Procedural Requirements of the NEPA
The requirements of NEPA are quite simple.149 NEPA requires
completion of an environmental impact statement (EIS) before any major
federal action that may affect the environment is undertaken. ° Although
ordinarily a private or state actor need not complete an EIS under
NEPA,5 l if a project is carried out by state or private actors utilizing
federal monies, or is carried out through state/federal or federal/private
partnership, an EIS might be required. 2 NEPA is a procedural statute,
not a results-based statute, so even in situations where an EIS is required
the agency need not select the option that causes the least amount of
harm.
15 3
2. Judicial Deference (or Non-Deference) to Administrative Decision
Making
154
A federal agency's interpretation of its Organic Act is subject to a
special kind of judicial deference as established by the Supreme Court in
Chevron, v. Nat' Res. Def. Council, and its progeny.1 5 5 According to
Chevron, the process of review is divided into two steps.5 6 At step one, the
court must determine, through the use of canons of statutory construction
and legislative history, "whether Congress has directly spoken to the
149 Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Environmental PolicyAct (NEPA), EPA.GOV,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/ (last vi ited Mar. 24,2015).
150 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
151 This is because such a project is not, by its very nature, a "federal action." See Carolina Action
v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (M.D. N.C. 1975) (finding that where there is no federal
involvement, there is no federal action), affd 522 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1975).
152 Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.3d 1068, 1089 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[TIhe distinguishing feature of
'federal' involvement is the ability to influence or control the outcome in material respects. The EIS
process is supposed to inform the decision-maker. This presupposes he has judgment to exercise. The
touchstone of major federal action, in the context of the case before us, is an agency's authority to
influence significant nonfederal activity. This influence must be more than the power to give
nonbinding advice to the nonfederal actor... Rather, the federal agency must possess actual power to
control the nonfederal activity."); see also Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Barnhart, 906 F.2d
1477, 1482 (10th Cir. 1990).
153 Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 519 (1978). The same
holds true in the context of harms to wildlife. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen's Council, 490 U.S.
332,351 (1989). ("[It would not ... violate[] NEPA if the [federal agency], after complying with the
Act's procedural requirements, ... decided that the benefits [of a particular option] justified [that
choice], notwithstanding the loss of 15%, 50%, or even 100%/6 of) that species in the affected area.").
"s For a more complete exposition of the same topic, see Devin Kenncy, Potemkin Villages of the
West: How a Simple Payment to Compensate Local Governments Became an Uncontrollable Federal Subsidy,
2 WILLAMETE ENVTL. LJ. 21 (2015).
155 Chevron v. Natl Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
"s Id. at 842-43.
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precise question at issue.""' If it has, the issue is resolved "for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress."15 s In that case, the court's construction of the statute is
binding on the agency and limits the range of permissible interpretations of
that statute.15 9
However, even assuming Congress has not spoken to the precise
question, or that the statute is otherwise ambiguous, at step two the court
does not have unbridled discretion to impose the meaning it prefers on the
statute.6 ° In that case, rather, "the question . . . is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."161 If the
interpretation is permissible, the reviewing court must uphold the agency's
interpretation of the statute, whether that interpretation is the one the
court itself would prefer-or not.162 This is because an agency is justified in
making "a binding interpretation of a statute it administers" by virtue of
the fact that Congress delegated to it the authority to make law.
1 63
However, not all agency rules or statements merit significant judicial
deference."6 Pursuant to § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), an agency is required to engage in the process of informal notice-
and-comment rulemaking when it announces a new rule, unless that rule
qualifies for an established exception.165 Excluding emergency situations,166
151 Id. at 842.
158 Id.
"59 How Chevron Step One Limits Permissibe Agency Interpretations: BrandXand the FCCs
Broadband Reclassification, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1016(2011); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Once the court has spoken, it becomes unlawfulfor the
agency to take a contradictory position; the statute now says what the court has prescribed.").
"6 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (noting that "the court does not simply impose its own construction
of the statute.").
161 Id. (emphasis added).
162 See, e.g., Claire R. Kelly & Patrick C. Reed, Once More Into the Breach: Reconciling Chevron
Analysis and De Novo Judicial Review After United States v. Haggar Apparel Company, 49 AM. U. L.
REV. 1167,1170 (2000) ("Under the second step, the court assesses whether the agency's interpretation
is permissible and reasonable. When the agency's interpretation is reasonable... step two requires the
court to accept, or'defer to,' a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision by the
agency that administers the statute.").
" According to one author, "the justification for allowing an agency to make a binding
interpretation of a statute it administers is that Congress delegated a portion of its law-making or
legislative authority to the agency, and the agency's resolution of silence or ambiguity through its
interpretations represents an exercise of delegated legislative authority. Thus a threshold question
under Chevron is whether the statute being interpreted is administered by an agency, as opposed to a
statute creating a private right of action enforced by the courts." Kelly & Reed, supra note 162, at 1189-
90.
9 1 For example, "[aln agency's interpretation of a statute... is a question of law which is
reviewed de novo." Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 1998).
165 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2015). These exceptions are "narrowly construed and only reluctantly
countenanced." NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 626 F.2d 1038, 1045
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
'6 § 553(bXB).
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an agency may only promulgate a rule without notice-and-comment
procedure ifit is either an interpretive rule or general statement of policy.
167
Rules made pursuant to this exception-that is, decisions not reached
through notice-and-comment proceedings or formal adjudication-are
entitled to less deference, or no deference at all, by a court.161 On the other
hand, the Court has noted that while such decisions and opinions do not
command deference, they are, however, "'entitled to respect' . . . to the
extent that those interpretations have the 'power to persuade.'"
1 69
After Christensen v. Harris County, the Supreme Court made clear, in
U.S. v. Mead Corp., that "[tihe fair measure of deference to an agency
administering its own statute has been understood to vary with
circumstances."17' In looking to those "varying circumstances," the Court
looks to a number of factors including the formality and consistency of the
agency's decision.171 To whatever extent present, agency decisions also
carry weight by virtue of the author's logic and persuasiveness.1 72 Mead sets
out a number of factors that lend a non-legislative rule imposed or created
by an agency's "power to persuade," such as the quality of the reasoning
behind the decision and its consistency with the agency's earlier and later
actions.1
73
167 § 553(b)(A); One factor that a court considers "is whether a purported policy statement
genuinely leaves the agency and its decision-makers free to exercise discretion." Am. Bus. Ass'n v.
United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
"' For example, when an agency "applies the policy [announced in a general statement of policy]
in a particular situation, it must be prepared to support the policy just as if the policy statement had
never been issued." Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see
a/so § 553(b)(B).
169 Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (internal citations omitted).
17 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228-30 (2001).
171 Id. at 228 (considering "the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position.").
'
73 Id. at 235 ("Such a ruling may surely claim the merit of its writer's thoroughness, logic and
expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight.").
173 Id. at 228; The full list of factors includes "[tihe thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944) ("Good administration of the Act and good judicial administration alike require that the
standards of public enforcement and those for determining prior ights shall be at variance only where
justified by good reason .... This Court has long given considerable and in some cases decisive weight
to Treasury Decisions and to interpretative regulations of the Treasury and of other bodies .... We
consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."). Presumably, the
"factors which give [a decision or interpretation the] power to persuade" are those circumstances
identified in Mead.
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II. OF GOATS AND MEN
Although the topic of wildlife translocation may appear to be of
parochial interest, the issue is, at least in the Western United States, of
great import to the management of wildlife for public recreation-both in
terms of hunting and wildlife viewing.'74 Significant evidence suggests that
if, for example, mountain goats themselves (Oreamnos americanus) are not
native to the region, then at least the genus (Oreamnos) likely is. 7'
However, current federal regulations impose illogical, biologically
nonsensical distinctions between species of non-native wildlife that are
allowed and those that are not.176 These distinctions have no basis in
underlying statutory law.'7 7 Furthermore, the very term "native" is itself in
question because, again, the federal land management agencies lack
statutory authorization to regulate on this basis.17 Not only do the organic
and enabling acts of these agencies fail to define "native," these Acts
neither reference the term nor any concept commonly associated
therewith.79
A. The translocation authority is an inherent part of fish and wildlife
management authority that states, as trustees of protected wildlife, must
utilize to effectively manage wildlife populations within their respective
jurisdictions. This authority encompasses both the translocation of native,
and non-native, game and non-game species.
The translocation power is ancient, dating back thousands of years.'0
This power was exercised throughout antiquity'8 ' and the modern era.8 2 In
174 Given that "47% of the [land contained in the] 11 coterminous western states" is federally
owned, any restrictions on State management authority in the West is a major limit on State authority
to govern its own affairs. Vincent et al., supra note 21, Summary. Compare this number-47%--with
the 4% of federally-owned lands in Eastern United States. Id.; see also The Open West, Ownedby the
Federal Government, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/23/us/westem-land-owned-by-the-federaml-
govemment.html?_r=0 (noting that "[tihe top states with the greatest percentage of federally owned
land are all the Western states" and listing the top ten states with the greatest percentage of federally
owned land).
175 See Jim I. Mead et al., Extinction ofHarrington's mountain goat, 83 PROCEEDINGS NAT'L
ACAD. SCIS. 836, 838-39 (1986).
176 Compare Bureau of Land Mgmt. Manual, ch. 6330, § (D)(ll)(e)(vii), (f), with § (D)(10).
177 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).
178 See supra Part I.C.i..
179 See 18 U.S.C. § 42(c) (2010). Neither the Forest Service nor BLM have any statutory mandate
to protect native species from non-native or exotic species, except to the extent BLM enforces the Lacey
Act as part of the Department of the Interior.
" The rise of agriculture hastened the frequency of such introductions dramatically, after all,
what is a crop plant or livestock, but a non-native, translocated species introduced for the benefit of
man in a new environment? SeeJared Diamond, Evolution, consequences andfuture ofplant and animal
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English history, for example, several species now considered endemic (or
native) to the British Isles were, in fact, introduced as game species by early
conquering powers. Such species include the European Rabbit,"'3
Common Pheasant,"' and Fallow Deer.' During the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the translocation of game species was very
common throughout the English speaking world8 6 by private,8 7 federal,l88
and state actors. 9 In the case of game species, such as Common or Ring-
domestication, NATURE, (Aug. 8, 2002),
.http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v418/n6898/fuU/natureO1019.html ("Eventually, people
transported some wild plants (such as wild cereals) from their natural habitats to more productive
habitats and began intentional cultivation."); 1 Nephi 16:11 (Book of Mormon) ("[W]e did take seed of
every kind that we might carry into the wilderness."); 1 Nephi 18:24 (Book of Mormon) ("And it came
to pass that we did begin to till the earth, and we began to plant seeds; yea, we did put all our seeds into
the earth, which we had brought from the land ofJerusalem. And it came to pass that they did grow
exceedingly, wherefore, we were blessed in abundance.").
"' For example, the Romans or early Phoenicians are believed to have reintroduced Fallow Deer
into Western Europe after the species, or a closely related species, died out after the last ice age. Online
Record Book. European Fallow Deer-North America Introduced, SAFARI CLUB INT'L (2015),
http://www.scirecordbook.org/european-fallow-deer-north-america-introduced/.
8 See generally HALVERSON, supra note 58.
' Rabbit were introduced following the Roman invasion of Britain in the early first century
AD. Remains ofRoman rabbit uncovered, BBC NEWS (Apr. 13,2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/england/norfolk/4439339.stm; see Nigel Cross, Food in Romano-
Britain, RESOURCES FOR HISTORY (2006),
http://resourcesforhistory.com/RomanFood in Britain.htm.
154 Cross, supra note 183.
s Fallow deer were reintroduced by the Normans during the Eleventh Century following an
earlier, apparently failed, attempt by the Romans to create a self-propagating population of the deer in
Britain. Fallow Deer, BRIT. DEER SOC'Y (2015), http://www.bds.org.uk/fallow.html. Aristocratic
hunters managed the deer population for centuries as a game species, while restricting hunting by the
common people.
" See, e.g., FeralAnimals inAustralia, DEP'T OFTHE ENV'T, AUSTRALIAN GOV'T,
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive-species/feral-animals-australia (last visitedMar.
13, 2015) (Australia: rabbits, sheep, red fox); Elizabeth Kolbert, The Big Kill, NEWYORKER (Dec. 22,
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/22/big-kill (New Zealand: mammals); History of
grey squirrels in UK, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/wildlife/10705527/History-of-grey-squirrels-in-UK.html
(United Kingdom: Grey Squirrels).
7 American Acclimatization Society, supra note 63 (discussing wildlife released by the Society,
including pheasants, starlings, sparrows, and salmon); Ornithological and PiscatorialAcclimatizing
Society, DAILY ALTA CAL., Feb. 13, 1871, at 1, available at http://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-
bin/cdnc?a=d&d=DAC18710213.2.3#.; see HALVERSON, supra note 58, at 61 (discussing the role of
private acclimatization societies in the translocation of game species throughout the world).
"I HALVERSON, supra note 58, at 38.
l See, e.g., Colorado Parks & Wildlife: Moose Reintroduction, COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE (Nov. 2013),
https'J/cpw.state.co.us/Documents/WildlifeSpecies/Mammals/MooseReintroductionFactSheet.pdf
(discussing the introduction of Moose in Colorado in 1978); Hunting in Oregon: Upland Bird Game
Species, OR. DEP'T FISH & WILDLIFE (2014),
http://www.dfw.state.or.us/resources/hunting/upland-bird/species/; Hi tory of Elk in Arkansas, ARK-
GAME &FISH COMM'N (2011), http://www.agfc.com/hunting/pages/huntingelkistory.aspx ("In
1981, the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, in cooperation with private citizens, initiated an[] elk
restoration project in the Ozark Mountains of northwest Arkansas."); Game MammalHunting,
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Necked Pheasant, Rainbow Trout, and various non-native cervids, they
were introduced for much the same reason as in the instant case: increased
recreational opportunities for sportsmen and women.1 90
Evidence suggests that mountain goats, when properly managed, are a
benign addition to ecosystems,191 but the issue here is not whether the
introduction is or was a good idea.192 That issue is one of science and policy,
and was addressed via the series of public meetings and decision by a
politically-accountable policy making board. What is relevant is that
humans have exercised the right to translocate species since before the
beginning of recorded history,193 and while Congress may act to curtail or
limit this right,194 it has not done so. This means that the authority remains
with state fish and wildlife agencies to act within state law to introduce or
translocate species."' Because, as will be discussed,96 BLM and the Forest
Service lack the authority to limit this power as exercised by state fish and
wildlife agencies,197 there is no reason to distinguish between the
HAWAII, Div. OF FORESTRY & WILDLIFE (2014),
http://dlnr.hawaii.gov/recreation/hunting/mammal/.
Mountain Goats, in particular, have proved popular with many State wildlife management
agencies and have been introduced in a number of areas. See Wendell Harmon, Notes on Mountain
Goats in the Black Hills, 25 J. MAMMALOGY 149,149 (1949); John W. Laundre, FinalReport: The
Status, Distribution and Management of Mountain Goats in the Greater Yello&wstone Ecosystem,
YELLOWSTONE NAT'L PARK REP. (1990) (noting that "[slince the 1920's state wildlife agencies in the
northwestern U.S. have introduced goats into previously uninhabited regions.").
90 HALVERSON, supra note 58, at 60.
" E-mail from Kerry Bums, Forest Wildlife Biologist, U.S. Forest Service, Black Hills
National Forest, to Devin Kenney, Law Student, Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law (Mar. 3, 2015, 10:21
PM GMT) (on file with author).
97 Admittedly, some of the translocations discussed above have impacted local environments
negatively. Kolbert, supra note 186. On the other hand, other species have become such a part of their
new environment that they are almost considered indigenous. Remains ofRoman Rabbit Uncovered,
supra note 183. In either instance, the distinction is irrelevant here because Congress simply has not
chosen to regulate wildlife translocations undertaken by the States as part of the State duty to manage
fish and wildlife.
" Diamond, supra note 180, at 700.
9The author does not question the broad authorization given to USFS, for example, to prevent
the "destruction" of national forest land. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). This mandate is broad enough to
justify the imposition of penalties against private persons and societies seeking to introduce or modify
forest service land. 36 C.F.R. § 251.23 (2014). What is at issue, is that Congress directed the judiciary
in the Forest Service Organic Act to construe the Act as not "affecting the jurisdiction or
responsibilities of the several States with respect o wildlife and fish on the national forests." 16 U.S.C.
§ 528 (2012). Since Congress did not create the RNA program, see 36 C.F.R. § 251.23, it did not
permit additional limitations being placed on State wildlife management authority pursuant to that
designation. 16 U.S.C. § 528.
195 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-15-2 (2014).
19 
See infra Part ll.B.
197 See 16 U.S.C. § 528; 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012). The Forest Service conceded as much when
it acknowledged, however, that the introduction of mountain goats was a "State decision and action."
Letter from Allen Rowley, Acting Supervisor, Manti-La Sal National Forest, to Kevin Albrecht, Chair,
Regional Advisory Council Wildlife Board (July 30,2014) (on file with author).
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maintenance of previously established populations of introduced species
and the establishment of new ones.19
Moreover, the BLM and Forest Service are statutorily limited from
"diminishing the responsibility and authority of the States for management
of fish and resident wildlife" as that authority existed in 1976.199 Perhaps
because there is no reasonable basis from which to dispute that States had
the authority before 1976 to maintain stocks of previously introduced
species-such as Rainbow Trout-BLM draws a distinction between pre-
1976 and post-1976 introduced species.200 Prior to 1976, however, the
States did not merely have the authority to restock trout, but instead had
the authority to manage fish and wildlife under state law."0 t This authority
included the introduction and translocation of species.2 The Forest
Service and BLM cannot impose an extra-statutory distinction-
particularly one that BLM implicitly recognizes as invalid° 3 -upon the
States in derogation of existing state management authority.204 Thus,
despite federal precedent to the contrary,205 the state ownership doctrine
remains relevant because state law controls and this theory is dominant at
the state level.206
'9' See infra text accompanying notes 233-37.
19943 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2015).
2 BuREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 144, at 1-41.
Congress emphatically declared that FLPMA "does not authorize exclusions simply because
hunting and fishing would interfere with resource-management goals." H.R. REP. No. 94-1724, at 60
(1976) (Conf. Rep.). Speaking of an earlier statute, the Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960,
Senator Humphrey read into the record a letter urging adoption of similar language on grounds that
preserved the intent of all parties not to interfere with State management authority. 106 CONG. REC.
12078, 12085 (1960). The provision was adopted. Id. at 12079.
22 See, e.g., UTAH Div. WiLDLIFE RES., supra note 72, at 3 (noting that mountain goats were
first introduced in Utah in 1967).
203 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 144, at 1-41 ("The BLM will prohibit, to extent
practicable andpermittedby Federal law, the introduction of any non-native species into WSAs.")
(emphasis added).
See discussion infra Part II.B.
0 Rather, federal precedent hat is apparently contrary. In the absence of contrary statutory
authority, the Kleppe and Hughes default favors State law. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543
(1976); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336, 337 (1979). Only where Congress has utilized federal
power to abrogate State authority or State law otherwise conflicts with controlling federal lawdoes
federal precedent invalidate the State ownership doctrine. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335-36. In Hughes, for
example, the Supreme Court found an Oklahoma statute to discriminate against interstate commerce
and thus to run afoul of the dormant commerce clause doctrine. Id. at 33 7-38.
"' Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 45, at 719.
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B. The Forest Service and BLM Lack the Authority to Regulate or Prevent
the Introduction of Wildlfe Species, Indigenous or Not, into the Lands They
Administer
Given the void of Congressionally granted authority for the Forest
Service or BLM to regulate introduced non-native species managed by the
States, and the general reservation of wildlife management authority to the
States, courts should err on the side of finding that authority remains with
the States.2 °7 Therefore, even if a species is deemed non-native--as are
mountain goats in a current dispute between the Forest Service and the
State of Utah-the State retains the authority to manage the species on all
Forest Service and BLM lands."' The Supreme Court has held that
preemption must be specific in areas of traditional state authority.2 9 In this
case, not only is there no explicit preemption, there is an explicit reservation
of authority to the States.21
Some argue that the agency regulations at issue trump state
law.21 1After all, the regulations at issue are very specific: the introduction of
non-native species is expressly or implicitly prohibited under both the
Forest Service and BLM versions.212 Courts have held, for example, that
"[w]here the State's law conflict with the . .. regulations of the National
Park Service . . . the local laws must recede."21  Though true-federal
regulations promulgated under valid statutory authority, and according to
proper procedure, may overcome State law-this argument does not apply
here because Congress has not authorized either BLM or the Forest
Service the authority to make regulations preempting State authority over
fish and wildlife. 214 This lack of authority vested in either the Forest Service
or BLM contrasts with that given to the National Park Service. Due to
' See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336; Lacoste v. Dep't of Conservation of La., 263 U.S. 545,549
(1920); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-28 (1896); see also Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Thomas,
932 F. Supp. 368,371 (D.D.C. 1996).
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-15-2 (2014).
20 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 545.
210 See 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).
211 Letter from Audrey Huang, Supervising Attorney, Clinical Legal Educ. Program, Colo.
Law, to Nora Rasure, Reg'l Forester, U.S. Forest Serv. 5 (Dec. 24,2014) (on file with the author).212 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 144, at 1-41-1-42; U.S. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T
OFAGRIC., FOREST SERVICE MANUAL 18 (2005).
213 United States v. Brown, 431 F. Supp. 56, 59, 63 (D. Minn. 1976).
214 Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Thomas, 932 F. Supp. 368, 371 (D.D.C. 1996) ("If Congress
intends to exercise the undoubtedly plenary power of the federal government over hunting on federal
lands in any respect, it has only to say so, 'the game laws or other statute of [a] state to the contrary
notwithstanding'... In the absence of such explicit statutory direction, however, the Forest Service has
concluded that its assertion of a general regulatory power over the practice of game-baiting in the
national forests ... would be, if not ultra vires, well within its discretion to eschew.") (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted).
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concerns over illegal poaching in Yellowstone and other parks,215 the
default is a ban on hunting in parks unless the organic act of the specific
park in question allows hunting.
2 16
For this reason, while it is true that as apples and oranges are both
fruit growing on trees, 21 and both the lands managed within the National
Park System and lands managed by the BLM and Forest Service are all
federally managed lands,218 the similarities end there. For example, in the
Voyageurs National Park, hunting was banned with the park's creation
because it is a national park subject to the National Park Organic Act.2 19 In
the case of BLM and the Forest Service, Congress included savings clauses
in the organic acts of each, reserving the right of the States to manage fish
and wildlife.220 Congress specifically reserved state wildlife management
authority, and no BLM or Forest Service regulation can override that
statutory reservation of authority.
221
C. To the extent the Forest Service's Research Natural Area regulation is
applied to, and meant o apply to, restrict the management authority of the
several States over wildlife in the National Forest, the application of the
regulation is arbitrary and capricious or, alternatively, ultra vires.
An agency's interpretation of the statute that it administers may be
entitled to significant deference,222 but only to the extent that Congress did
not statutorily foreclose that interpretation.223 Although the narrow issue
might seem to be whether or not the States have default authority to
translocate "non-native" wildlife, the real issue is much broader.224 As
discussed above, there is no question that early Roman and English law
allowed the translocation of game species of wildlife. 22' This power was
215 4 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2014) (identifying purpose of National Parks as to "conserve the
scenery and natural and historic objects and wild life therein.").2 6 Nat. Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 903 (D.D.C. 1986).
See generally James E. Barone, ComparingApples and Oranges: 4 Randomised Prospective Study,
321 BRIT. MED.J. 1569 (2000).
28 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2014); 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2014); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2014).
19 This is because Congress has spoken to, and resolved, the issue as required under the Kleppe
framework. Nat. RifleAss'n, 628 F. Supp. at 903.
220 16 U.S.C. § 528; 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a).
22 See Nat. Family Planning & Reproductive Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F. 3d 826, 829
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
2 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
.. Id. at 842.
' Seegenerally Letter from Mary H. O'Brien, Utah Forests Program Director, Grand Canyon
Trust, to Nora Rasure, Regional Forester, Intermountain Regional Office, United States Forest
Service, and Allen Rowley, Supervisor, Manti-La Sal National Forest 1 (Sept. 17,2013) [hereinafter
"Grand Canyon Trust letter"] (on file with the author); Huang, supra note 211.
225 See, e.g., Fallow Deer, supra note 185; Cross, supra note 183.
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coupled with the continuing authority to regulate the taking of the species
once introduced.226 American wildlife law is but an outgrowth of the
historical legal traditions of Roman and English law,227 and translocations
by state wildlife management agencies continue to be commonplace.22
In the Modem Era, both private21' and state210 actors continued-and
continue-to exercise this common law authority,231 to the extent it is not
modified by state statute or preempted by federal statutory law.232 For
example, in Utah, the state continues to hold translocation power.
233
Therefore, it should be seen that the translocation power is but one aspect
of wildlife management authority.234 As the Supreme Court concluded in
1976, although Congress may preempt this authority on federal land, the
State exercises authority over wildlife unless Congress has explicitly
declared otherwise.235 In this case, not only has Congress spoken to, and
unambiguously2 36 resolved, the issue of whether it is the state or the Forest
Service that manages wildlife, it has done so numerous times.237 Therefore,
2 Fallow Deer, supra note 185 (discussing how Norman invaders introduced Fallow Deer and
for centuries afterward managed the species for aristocratic use).
"2 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-28 (1896).
228 Seesupra text accompanying note 189.
22
9 
American Acclimatization Society, supra note 68 (discussing wildlife released by the Society, including
pheasants, starlings, sparrows, and salmon); Ornithological and Piscatorial Acclimatizing Society, DAILY
ALTA CAL. (Feb. 13, 1871), http://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a=d&d=DAC18710213.2.3#; see also
HALVERSON, supra note 58, at 28-29 (discussing the role of private acclimatization societies in the
translocation of game species throughout the world).
2 Here, meaning governmental actors. Both Federal and State agencies have acted to introduce
game species and other species deemed helpful in the United States. See generally HALVERSON, supra
note 58 (discussing role of Federal and State agencies leading to the nationwide introduction of
Rainbow Trout).
231 See, e.g., Great Summer Fishing at Cleveland Reservoir, UTAH.GOV (June 13, 2014),
http://wildlife.utah.gov/wildlife-news/1436-great-summer-fishing-at-develand-reservoir.htm
(discussing state program stocking trout in National Forest); COLORADO PARKS &WILDLIFE, supra
note 189, at 1 (discussing moose reintroduction).
232 KIeppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,545 (1976).
233 As evidenced by the continual reintroduction of game species like Rainbow Trout. Great
Summer Fishing, supra note 231, at 1.
2'4 See supra Part II.A.
2s Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539; see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,336 (1979); Lacoste v.
Dep't of Conservation of State of La., 263 U.S. 545, 549 (1920).
There is no need to proceed to Chevron step two because the statute is not ambiguous.
Congress plainly did not delegate to the Forest Service the authority that the Grand Canyon Trust
believes that it has. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
17 Most relevant here are the Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528,
the Wilderness Act of 1964,16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7), and the Federal Land Management Policy Act of
1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1172(b). See, supra Subsection I.B.iii. These statutes do not, on their face allow for
any exceptions. To the extent BLM and the Forest Service are authorized to make exceptions to state
authority, as allowed in FLPMA under certain exigent circumstances--such as to protect human
safety-Congress has emphatically declared that the statutory authority of the Forest Service-and
BLM--"does not authorize exclusions simply because hunting and fishing would interfere with
resource-management goals." H. CONF. REP. NO. 94-1724, at 60 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175,6229.
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regulatory decisions, whether by regulation or policy, that exceed statutory
authorization are ultra vires and unenforceable.23  Neither the Forest
Service nor BLM can (or may) amend a statute through regulation,
interpretive rule, or policy manual.2 9
D. As there is no documented destruction of federal property, the Forest
Service's authority under the Property Clause to prevent destruction is not
yet available.
Federal regulations and statutes acknowledge that each state has
primary authority over wildlife management on Forest Service and BLM
lands within their jurisdiction.24 ° To the extent Congress acts to impose a
legal regime, the federal government has absolute control over federal
lands.24 1 Where the government does not act, however, this authority is
reserved to the States.42
On the other hand, the Forest Service has the well-established
authority to limit state wildlife management activity-or at least to act in
conflict with such activity-where state-managed wildlife threatens the
destruction of federal property.2' This authority dates back to Hunt v.
United States, where, in response to the massive overpopulation of deer, the
Supreme Court upheld the Forest Service's reduction of deer herds on
federal lands in Arizona.2' Although Congress has not acted to extend this
authority to BLM, 241 the Supreme Court's reading of the Property Clause
The provisions above, however, are far from the only instances where Congress has acted to
reserve state authority to manage wildlife. See also Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1333(a) (2004); Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2909 (1980); Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (1973); Sikes Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 670a (2011).
2'8 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. In the Forest Service example, in particular, because Congress
did not create the RNA program, see 36 C.F.R. § 251.23 (1966), it cannot be rationally presumed that
Congress acquiesced to additional limitations being placed on state wildlife management authority
pursuant o that designation. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1960).
239 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)-(B) (1966). For example, when an agency "applies the policy
[announced in a general statement of policy] in a particular situation, it must be prepared to support the
policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued." Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. Fed. Power Comm'n,
506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cit. 1974); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). Nor,
indeed, can it change its own legislative rule reaffirming the statute through the creation of contrary
interpretive rules and policy manuals.
2 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 528; 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7) (2014); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1976). For
examples of comparable regulations, see 36 C.F.R. § 293.10 (1973); 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(c) (1971).
24 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,539 (1976).
242 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 545; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,336 (1979).
2A3 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 545-46.
244 Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 99-101 (1928).
24 FLPMA, BLM's Organic Act, has no comparable provision to that of 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1976)
which directs "[tihe Secretary of Agriculture [to] make provisions for the protection against destruction
by fire and depredations upon the public forests and national forests." See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1976).
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would certainly allow Congress to do so.2 4 6 In the interim, however, Hunt
and its progeny merely stand for the proposition that to the extent a federal
agency-such as the Forest Service or BLM-is charged with protecting
federal lands or properties from "destruction," the agency may act through
its agents to "do whatever is necessary... upon its own property to protect
it."247 Actions taken pursuant to this authority-the authority to prevent
imminent, certain destruction-may be taken "without any regard to the
game laws of the state."
248
It is important to realize that at the time Huntwas decided, States were
accorded broad control over, and tacit ownership of, wildlife, which had
only recently been limited to a small degree.249 As a counterpoint to this
authority, however, the Court's decision in Hunt is entirely in accord with
the then-leading decisions on the authority of private landowners to
protect their property from wildlife depredations.2 0 The few courts having
addressed the issue in detail had concluded that in situations where, as
here, wild animals were caught destroying private property, a person had a
right to kill the offending wildlife in defense of that property.
25 1
246 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 537.
17 United States v. Hunt, 19 F.2d 634, 640 (D. Ariz. 1927).
2s Id. at 641.
"' Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) ("No doubt it is true that as between a State
and its inhabitants the State may regulate the killing and sale of such birds, but it does not follow that
its authority is exclusive of paramount powers. To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a
slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of
ownership."). Confusingly, the Supreme Court in Lacoste, reaffirmed just four years later that states
.owned" the wildlife within their borders. Lacoste v. Dep't of Conservation of State of La., 263 U.S.
545,549 (1920) (holding that state owns wildlife to the extent ownership is possible and is responsible,
therefore, for the management thereof). The discrepancy here may arise from the fact that Holland
concerned solely the regulation of migratory birds which, as noted by the Court, are very mobile: "The
whole foundation of the State's rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday
had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another State and in a week a thousand miles away." Holland, 252
U.S. at 434.
s Right to kill game in defense ofperson or property, 21 A.L.R. 199-200 (1922).
251 See, e.g., State v. Burk, 195 P. 16,18 (Wash. 1921) ("[I]t may be justly said that one who kills
an elk in defense of himself or his property, if such killing was reasonably necessary for such purpose, is
not guilty of violating the law."); State v. Ward, 152 N.W. 501,502 (Iowa 1915) ("It will be noted that
the deer was killed, not only while upon the defendant's premises, but while he was actually engaged in
the destruction of the defendant's property. Giving the testimony the fullest credence, the deer was one
of great voracity. He was capable of doing, and was threatening to do, great injury to defendant's
property. By way of analogy we may note that the plea of reasonable self-defense may always be
interposed in justification of the killing of a human being. We see no fair reason for holding that the
same plea may not be interposed in justification of the killing of a goat or a deer."); Aldrich v. Wright,
53 N.H. 398,404 (1873).
More recent decisions have reached the same conclusion under similar circumstances. See, e.g.,
State v. Vander Houwen, 177 P.3d 93, 94 (Wash. 2008); Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371, 377 (Wyo.
1962); Cotton v. State, 17 So. 2d 590,591 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944).
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Thus, the holding of Hunt is: (1) that Congress can authorize the
Department of Agriculture to preempt state law
252 through regulation25 3
and (2) that as it does so by destroying wildlife, the United States
government acts just as any private landowner could do.2 4 This does not
mean that the federal government may control a species anytime it "feels"
like doing so, and it especially cannot do so before putative damage has
occurred.5 Just as a private landowner in 1928 could not simply kill or
destroy wild animals straying onto his or her property, but could do so if
there was damage, the Forest Service is authorized to do likewise according
to the Congressional grant of authority taken pursuant to the Property
Clause.256
Some have, and do, read Hunt to say much more than this, believing
that federal land management agencies may engage in preemptive steps to
prevent "destruction" by disallowing the introduction of non-native
species, or by removing them once introduced.257 Such a reading is in error,
failing to fundamentally understand the distinction between a Hunt-like
scenario and the use of the authority they purport to derive from the
decision.2" A brief sampling of this record is illustrative:
2 In Hunt, the law in question was Arizona's prohibition on hunting deer outside of season.
Hunt, 19 F.2d at 637 (the Secretary of Agriculture's authority preempted that law to the extent
necessary to prevent destruction of federal property.); Id. at 640-41 ("[W]e think there can be no doubt
of the right of the government of the United States to do whatever is necessary for it to do upon its own
property to protect it from the depredations complained of, including the killing or removal of whatever
number of the deer as may be necessary, without any regard to the game laws of the state of Arizona.").
3 Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928) ("The direction given by the Secretary of
Agriculture was within the authority conferred upon him by act of Congress."); see Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
14 Hunt, 19 F.2d 634,641 (D. Ariz. 1927); UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., supra note 72, at 5
(acknowledging that "[i]f mountain goat use is demonstrated to be excessive, the Division must work
cooperatively with the Forest Service to manage goat populations to acceptable numbers").
15 Note that the damage in Hunt was ongoing and pervasive. See Hunt, 278 U.S. at 100.
Moreover, the Secretary had tried for some time to reach a compromise with the State before acting
unilaterally. Hunt, 19 F.2d at 640.
2s6 Annotation, Right to Kill Game in Defense of Person or Property, supra note 250, at 199-200;
Hunt, 19 F.2d at 640. Today, the private right to destroy nuisance wildlife is governed by statutory law
under principles that differ from those prevailing in 1928, when the Supreme Court decided Hunt.
2s7 Huang, supra note 211, at 4.
Although the private right is today limited by State law, formerly this right was considered to
be very expansive. Right to killgame in defense of property, supra note 250, at 199. Hunt, of course,
recognized that State law could not limit the Secretary's authority to prevent the destruction of federal
property. Hunt, 19 F.2d at 640 (The United States, "[b]eing owner of the land, it, as a necessary
consequence, owns every tree, without regard to age or size, and all growth of every character
constituting part and parcel of the land. As such owner, the government is legally and justly entitled to
protect the entire property of every kind and character, and by means and methods of its own selection
exercised through its own agents.").
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[D]eer have increased in number so rapidly within the past
three years that on certain parts of the lands there is no
longer sufficient forage available for their subsistence....
[T]hey have committed great injury and damage to the
said lands of the complainant by overbrowsing and killing
the young tree growth, and the shrubs, bushes, and other
forage plants upon which they principally subsist, all of
which are of great value. . . . [Slince November, 1924,
about 10,000 of them have died because of the fact that
there was insufficient forage available for their sustenance,
a large part of such loss by death having fallen on the fawns
born during the summer of 1924, there now remaining
only about 10 per cent. of such 1924 fawns.25 9
Thus, although the record at the Supreme Court is scanty, the lower court
decision makes clear that it was the extensive findings of destruction
actually caused in the Grand Canyon National Game Preserve by the
massive overpopulation of deer that justified the Forest Service's removal
program. 260
E. BLM's WSA1 Regulation and the Forest Service's RNA Regulation Are
Ultra Vires as Applied to the Several States
Both the BLM and Forest Service Manuals prohibiting the transplant
of "non-native" species are non-binding because in neither instance does
the language of the Manual control the state. Taking the Forest Service
example first, to the extent the RNA rule prohibits the state's management
of non-native species within RNAs, that regulation is ultra vires-none of
the statutes cited give such authority to the Forest Service.26 The Forest
Service may have authority to implement RNA restrictions against private
parties,2 2 but not the States because state authority to manage wildlife is
reserved by the savings clause.263 To the extent the RNA rule and the
Forest Service Manual attempt to change what Congress has established,
2s9 Hunt, 19 F.2d at 636.
See generally id. at 636-640.
' See supra text accompanying note 134.
Whether it does or does not is entirely irrelevant here and is beyond the scope of this Article.
_, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2014).
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the rule and manual are acting outside the authority of the Forest Service
and are thus ultra vires.2 4
As a brief review of the RNA rule history makes clear the original
regulation, which remains unchanged since promulgation, was based on 16
U.S.C. § 551.265 This statute, originally passed in 1897, concerned only
authority to prevent forest fires and damage to the National Forest
System.266 This statute remained unchanged in 1966 except for updates to
reflect codification of U.S. statutes.267 There is no reason to believe that the
enacting Congress intended the Forest Service to have or exercise this
authority.
268
Turning to the BLM, the policies it has adopted with regard to state
fish and wildlife agencies' management authority in wilderness areas are a
direct contradiction of the limits placed on BLM by FLPMA and the
Wilderness Act.2 69 The only uses of wilderness areas that are prohibited
are: commercial enterprise, permanent or temporary roads, motor vehicles,
i See, e.g., Nat. Family Planning & Reproductive Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826,
829 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that where an administrative rule and a statute conflict, the statute
always wins).
' Experimental Areas and Research Natural Areas, 31 Fed. Reg. 5072,5072 (Mar. 29, 1966) (to
be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 251.23); see supra Part I.C.i.l.a. (briefly reviewing the statutes claimed as
authority for the regulation and showing that § 551 remains Forest Service's primary source of
authority).
'The Congressional record from the time makes this point very dear. See 30 Cong. Rec. 905,
912 (1897) (statement of Sen. White) ("I might add that it would be a good thing to incorporate in this
bill a provision for taking care of [forest] reservations [i.e. National Forests]. I have seen from my own
doorstep during last year, for three weeks, fires raging within the limits of a forest reservation within
which there was no Government official to do any good and from which everyone who could have
protected the flaming forest was by law excluded."); see also id. at 912-13 (statement of Sen. Pettigrew)
("Under existing law these reservations are withdrawn from settlement, and yet no care is taken to
preserve the timber therein. The consequence is that fires destroy more timber than all the settlers
would consume.")Id at 913 (recommending the amendment hat became modem 16 U.S.C. § 551); Id.
at 969 (statement of Rep. McRae) (expressing need to prevent total destruction of forests).
" Compare Sundry Appropriations Act of 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat. 11, 35, with 16 U.S.C. § 551
(2012).
a Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1896). Indeed, given that the leading Supreme
Court decision of the era specifically recognized the states' near exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
wildlife, any reference at all to the authority of state wildlife management would have been
unnecessarily redundant.
29 Compare BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 144, at 1-41-42 ("The BLM will prohibit, to
extent practicable and permitted by Federal law, the introduction of any non-native species into WSAs
• .. the BLM will remove, to the extent practicable and permitted by Federal law, any non-native fish
or wildlife species from WSAs."), and POLICIES AND GUIDELINES FOR FISH AND WILDLIFE
MANAGEMENT IN NATIONAL FOREST AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT WILDERNESS §
F.12 (2006) ("Transplants... of terrestrial wildlife species in wilderness may be permitted if necessary.
. Transplant projects require advance written approval by the Federal administering agency."), witb
43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (restricting BLM and the Forest Service to preempt State wildlife management
authority only when necessary to prevent hunting or fishing "for reasons of public safety,
administration, or compliance with provisions ofapplicable law"), and 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7)
(reserving management of wildlife to the States).
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motorized equipment, motorboats, mechanical transport, aircraft landing,
installations, and structures.270 These are the only activities prohibited
under the Wilderness Act, none of which relate to a preference for native
over non-native wildlife .2 " This provision also does not restrict state
management authority because, again, § 1133(d)(7) specifically reserves to
the States jurisdiction over wildlife management.272 The structure of the
Act would seem to suggest that the uses described in subsection (d) of §
1133 are exceptions to the restrictions imposed by the rest of the chapter.
Therefore, a state may engage in the activities prohibited in § 1133(c) if
necessary to "the jurisdiction or responsibilities" of that state "with respect
to fish and wildlife."27 Finally, this section of the Manual is itself ultra vires
with regard to the very administrative regulations that it purports to
interpret27' because, as the Department of the Interior recognized in 43
C.F.R. § 24.4(c)-the regulation concerning BLM's authority to manage
wildlife in wilderness areas-the States have "the primary authority and
responsibility ... for the management of fish and resident276 wildlife."2 77
F. Agency Manuals Are Interpretive Rules That, Although Entitled to Some
Deference, Cannot Be Enforced Judicially Against the State
The Forest Service and BLM Manuals are either invalid as a legislative
rule because they were created without notice-and-comment rulemaking as
270 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
2
71 
Id.
272 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7).
273 See id. § 1133(d) ("The following special provisions are hereby made[.]"); see a/sol6 U.S.C. §
1133(d)(1) (allowing the Secretary of Agriculture to use aircraft for "the control of fire, insects, and
diseases" and directing the Secretary to continue to allow aircraft and motorboats where "these uses
have already become established"); 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) ("Commercial services may be performed
within the wilderness areas designated by this chapter to the extent necessary for activities which are
proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas.").
27 § 1133(d)(7).
27 Alcarez v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that interpretive rules, by their
very nature, must "interpret" something. Legislative rules "create law... incrementally imposing
general, extra-statutory obligations... [while i]nterpretative rules, merely clarify or explain existing
law or regulations."); see Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33,38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (providing that interpretive rules are not
binding authority in the same manner as legislative rules).
276 Neither FLPMA nor 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(c) define "resident wildlife." This leaves the definition
to debate, as noted in supra Part 11I.C.i..
277 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 144, at 1-41-42. To be fair, the BLM Manual does
seem to acknowledge this-or at least hedge its bet-by noting that it will only act "to extent practicable
and permitted by Federal law." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (considering manuals interpretive rules under the
APA). H.R. REP. NO. 94-1724, at 60 (1976), reprnted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6228,6231 (FLPMA,
however, "does not authorize exclusions simply because hunting and fishing would interfere with
resource-management goals.").
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required by the APA,278 or are merely advisory without substantive effect
because they are interpretive rules.279 An agency may create a valid
interpretive rule without utilizing the notice-and-comment process.
2 0
Such a rule, however, while perhaps binding to some degree on the
discretion of the agency in achieving its regulatory goals,281 is binding on
third parties only to the extent that it does not conflict with the underlying
282 tht1t1statute, and that it has the "power to persuade."283 Since neither the
Forest Service nor the BLM utilizes the notice-and-comment process
when promulgating its manual, the BLM policies are interpretive rules.284
The BLM policies conflict with the underlying statue285 and, as interpreted
by the BLM, could lead to absurd results.28Therefore, they do not have the
power to persuade.27 They must fall either as invalid or as inapplicable
against the States.8 8
27 N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 626 F.2d 1038, 1045 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (Legislative rules must be created through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
This is true unless the rule falls within certain enumerated exceptions of§ 553(b). These exceptions are
"narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced.").
2'9 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A); see Amer. Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525,529 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (providing that one factor courts consider in deciding whether a rule is interpretive or legislative
"is whether a purported policy statement genuinely leaves the agency and its decision-makers free to
exercise discretion."); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 38 (holding that if the rule is a mere
"statement of policy," the agency "must be prepared to support the policy just as if the policy statement
had never been issued.").
o 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)-(B); see Alcarez, 746 F.2d at 613.
Seegenerally Am. Bus. Ass'n, 627 F.2d at 529 (suggesting that rules are binding to some degree
on the discretion of the agency promulgating the rule).
' See generally Nati Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826,
829 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating that any rule or regulation that conflicts with statutory authority is
invalid).
' See generally Christensen v. Harris Cnty. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (asserting that the agency's interpretation of the statute "contained in
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law... are
'entitled to respect'. . . but only to the extent they have the 'power to persuade.).
4 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; Alcarez, 746 F.2d at 613.
5 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).
aM See generally BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 144. If BLM can make sure to prohibit
the introduction of what they consider non-natives in order to protect their property, then what other
limits could they place on wildlife management? Could BLM, for example, prohibit hunting
immediately after rainfall because of potential "vegetation destruction"?
27 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
' See generally 16 U.S.C. §528 (2012); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d
33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (considering that the Forest Service has no authority, given the savings clause
of 16 U.S.C. §528, to restrict the Division of Wildlife Resource's wildlife management authority on any
National Forest land in the State of Utah, the persuasive power of either the manual or the regulation is
likely to be very low).
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G. The Forest Service Cannot Require a State to Obtain a Permit Before
Using National Forestland to Carry Out Fish and Wildlife Management
Activities
Although Forest Service regulations ordinarily require the use of a
special-use permit, this regulation cannot be applied against the several
States."9 First, and most obvious, the permitting requirement is regulatory
while the savings clause reserving to the States the right to manage fish and
wildlife is statutory.29 Second, FLPMA explicitly states that the Forest
Service cannot "require Federal permits to hunt and fish on public lands or
on lands in the National Forest System."291 If the Forest Service cannot
require sportsmen to obtain permits to fish or hunt, then by extension it
cannot require state officials to submit to the permitting requirement in
order to manage the fish and wildlife to be fished or hunted.292
Furthermore, the same provision makes clear that FLPMA is not intended
to "diminish[] the responsibility and authority of the States for
management of fish and resident wildlife."293 Prior to the enactment of
FLPMA, States conducted translocations without any type of federal
permitting requirement.294 To require a state to first obtain a federal permit
before engaging in activity that clearly falls within the scope of the existing
wildlife management authority, that authority would be "diminish[ed]."295
Therefore, to the extent these mandates conflict,296 the statutory duty must
control.2 97
See 16 U.S.C. § 528; 36 C.F.R. § 293.10 (2015).
16 U.S.C. §528; 36 C.F.R §251.50(a) (2015).
43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2015).
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that such a
reading would seem contrary to the very spirit of FLPMA as "A state wildlife-management agency
which must seek federal approval for each program it initiations can hardly be said to have
'responsibility and authority' for its own affairs.").
m 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
29 See generally HALVERSON, supra note 58 (describing the role of the states, private
acclimatization societies, and federal government in the introduction and propagation of rainbow
trout).
295 See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
2 See Huang, supra note 211, at 9 (suggesting that these requirements do not conflict, although
dearly not all would agree).
' There is no question that a statutory mandate overrules a regulatory one where there is a
conflict, because "a valid statute always prevails over a conflicting regulation." Nat. Family Planning &
Reprod. Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826,829 (D.C. Cir. 2006). But see Friends of
Columbia Gorge v. Elicker, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1153 (D. Or. 2007) [hereinafter Friends I],
depublished by 2011 WL 3205773 (D. Or. 2011) [hereinafter Friends HI] (finding that the Forest Service
special use regulation required Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife to obtain special use permit to
introduce mountain goats in Scenic Area).
A GOAT Too FAR?
H. Taking as an example, the current controversy over the introduction of
mountain goats in the Western United States, to the extent the agencies'
regulations are relevant or not contrary to Congressional mandate as
applied to the States, the introduction of non-native game species violates
neither the statutory nor regulatory duties the regulations impose.
History has shown that properly managed mountain goat populations,
even if established by translocation, do not cause habitat destruction.2 98 For
example, a population in Cascades National Park, commonly considered to
be the poster-child of poor mountain goat management, is very different
because the goat population is not managed by the state Fish & Wildlife
agency2 99 In fact, the National Park Service prohibits their hunting.
30 0
Without hunting or a natural predator, goat populations boomed in the
Park and they predictably caused damage.301 Again, this situation is unique
and dissimilar to most States since hunting is generally prohibited in
National Parks, whereas it is permitted in BLM and Forest Service
lands.30 2 Hunting is a goal of most Fish and Wildlife Agencies that have
introduced the goats: for example, the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
in their Mountain Goat Management Plan contemplated that hunting may
begin in the event that the populations reach a level where a harvest is
sustainable. Indeed, the establishment of new goat populations furthers the
Division's goal "to expand both hunting and viewing opportunities for
mountain goats while ensuring their long-term viability in Utah."30 3
On the other hand, there is no other location where the introduction of
mountain goats resulted in the deterioration of the existing floral
communities and habitats. In Yellowstone National Park, for example, a
study performed to determine whether mountain goats were causing
damage3" found that mountain goats were responsible for no to very little
damage in the Park, and no action was either recommended or taken in
2 See, e.g., Laundre, supra note 189, at 41 ("Impacts on the ecosystem-Surveys of goat range in
Glacier National Park, Montana and Mt. Baldy, Idaho with high densities of goats indicate little
physical damage and percent cover of grass and forbs comparable to similar habitat in Yellowstone
Park. Based on these surveys, goat densities in both Parks, even at high population estimates, would
likely not be high enough to significantly impact the physical or floral components of the Parks.").
2" Id. at 1 ("The impact of goats is compounded in Olympic Park because goats are protected
from human hunting and therefore occur in higher densities than in exploited populations.").
3Id.
301 
id.
302 Nat'l. Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903,910-11 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
301 UTAH Div. WILDLIFE RES., supra note 72, at 8. Indeed, some of those in opposition to the
further introduction of goats believe mountain goat introduction "is just about creating more hunting
opportunities." Brett Prettyman, Utah Board OKs Mountain Goat Introduction Plan, SALT LAKE TRIB.
(June 10, 2013), httpi/www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/56411324-78/utah-mountain-goats-plan.html.csp.
' Laundre, supra note 189, at 1.
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response to the perceived "threat."30 5 In South Dakota, mountain goats
escaped into the wild during the early years of the twentieth century in
what is now a federal wilderness area, and have since flourished.3 6 There,
no damage has been reported after almost one hundred years of use by the
goats.307 Finally, mountain goats are present in other areas demarcated
"Wilderness Areas," and in these areas they are managed by the affected
states in conjunction with federal input without negative habitat impacts.3 8
III. AND Now FOR MORE OF THE SAME, WITH A SLIGHT TWIST: OR,
WHY NEPA IS IRRELEVANT TO WILDLIFE TRANSLOCATIONS
DONE WITHOUT FEDERAL CONSENT, APPROVAL, OR SUPPORT
At the most obvious level, this much is clear: federal inaction is not
action.3" For this reason, the Forest Service, quite reasonably, disclaimed
authority over the introduction of mountain goats in Utah, noting that the
introduction was a "State action" that it did not have the authority to
prevent."' "NEPA refers only to decisions which the agency anticipates
will lead to actions... [t]hat is, only when an agency reaches the point in
deliberations when it is ready to propose a course of action need it produce
an impact statement."311 In the instance that the action considered is a
private or state action, only "[wihere an agency initiates federal action by
ns Id. at 25 ("Of all the faunal species in the Parks, increasing mountain goat populations would
most likely affect bighorn sheep. Goats and sheep have similar niches along several resource axes and
co-occur over much of their respective ranges. Mountain goats and bighorn sheep could compete for
these resources through either interference or resource competition."); see id. at 41-42 (finding that,
despite expectations, at low population levels the presence of goats had no impact on bighorn sheep); see
also id. at 48 (recommending the Park Service to take no action to reduce mountain goat numbers).
306 Harmon, supra note 189, at 149.
307E-mail from Kerry Burns, supra note 191 ("Mountain goats have been in that Black Elk
Wilderness since the 1920s (I think) -before it was designated wilderness. I am not aware of any
research study done in the Black Elk Wilderness to determine effects of goats on vegetation. Goat
numbers are small, and we haven't seen problems with vegetation. We do have some sensitive plant
species and one ESA listed plant in the Wilderness and those are monitored for condition. I have not
seen any effects or limitations tied to mm goats.").
30s UTAH Div. WILDLIFE RES., supra note 72, at 16.
30 Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1239-40 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that the
refusal of a federal agency to prevent a state wildlife management agency from acting does not
constitute reviewable action); State of Alaska v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 537, 537 (9th Cir. 1979) ('[T]he
nonexercise of power by an executive-branch officer does not call for compliance with NEPA.. ..");
Biderman v. Morton, 497 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1974) (affirming district court dismissal alleging
NEPA violation on the grounds that "in alleging only federal inaction, the complaint failed to state a
claim under NEPA").
0 Letter from Allen Rowley, Acting Forest Supervisor, Manti-La Sal Nat'l Forest, to Kevin
Albrecht, Chair, Regl Advisory Council, Wildlife Board (July 30, 2013) (on file with the Author).
3t Andrus, 627 F.2d at 1243.
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publishing a proposal and then holding hearings..., [does] the statute...
appear to require an impact statement."
312
Since the Forest Service has done nothing more than "not stop" the
state of Utah from introducing goats on state-owned land, "there is
nothing that could be the subject of the analysis envisioned by the statute
for an impact statement."313 In sum, there is no federal action "where an
agency has done nothing more than fail to prevent the other party's action
from occurring."314 Where at least one federal agency or another has not
acted to regulate or otherwise facilitate private or state action, private or
state action taken without the use of federal monies is not federal action.315
Therefore, although a host of minimal actions, such as "federal license[s],
permits, leases, loans, grants, insurance, contracts, contract extensions and
modifications, conveyances, assistance authorizations, approvals of right-
of ways, or filings... may require preparation of an impact statement," the
agency need neither prepare an impact statement nor take further action
under NEPA where the agency has done nothing, approved nothing.316 To
require otherwise would be to impose an unreasonable administrative
burden on the agency.
317
In a situation markedly similar to the ongoing controversy in Utah, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon found that the Forest
Service violated NEPA when it did not conduct an EIS before approving
the introduction of mountain goats into a National Scenic Area,318 the
Columbia River Gorge.319 The court concluded that the National Forest
"special use" permit requirement applied to the state320 and, therefore,
determined that the Forest Service's decision to not require the
312 
Id. at 1244.
313 
id.
314 id.
315 See id. at 1245 (noting that in all instances where "major federal action[s]" have been found,
the action taken was overt rather than "wholly passive").
316 id.
317 
Id. at 1246 ("No agency could meet its NEPA obligations ifit had to prepare an
environmental impact statement every time the agency had power to act but did not do so.").
311 Ile Columbia River National Scenic Area Act, which is not at issue in Utah, requires
considerable federal intervention in the wildlife management role of the states: the statute created a
commission with federal representation that had to approve wildlife management plans for the area.
There has to be a consistency review for some areas of the Scenic Area. Thus there had to be federal
action to approve the introduction. See 16 U.S.C. § 544 (1994). In the Manti-La Sal National Forest,
no such commission exists and no such federal approval is required.
3 1 9
Friends , 598 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1155 (D. Or. 2007), depublisbedby Friends II, 2011 WL
3205773 (D. Or. 2011).
3 
Id. at 1141 (explaining that ODFW worked with the Forest Service to develop an
introduction plan for mountain goat in the Columbia River Gorge Scenic Area); id. ("On April 15,
2005, Forest Service finalized a Memorandum of Understanding with ODFW describing the
cooperative efforts Forest Service and ODFW would take to establish a viable population of Rocky
Mountain goats in the Scenic Area.").
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Department of Fish & Wildlife (ODFW) to obtain a permit constituted a
federal action.321 This case is distinguishable, however, because the Forest
Service worked closely with the state of Oregon and approved the
Reintroduction Plan created by the ODFW.322 Moreover, although
Friends I holds that the Forest Service's failure to produce an EIS violated
NEPA because it was required to approve or disapprove the ODFW's
Mountain Goat Reintroduction plan as a "special use" of the National
Forest,323 there is considerable reason to question the value of this
holding.324
321 Id. at 1153 (finding that special use requirement was binding on the State; USFS's failure to
require such approval was a "major federal action").
3 Id. at 1152 ("[Tlhe Memorandum reflects the Forest Service assisted and cooperated in
developing the Reintroduction Plan. In addition, the Reintroduction Plan itself defines the project as a
cooperative effort between ODFW and Forest Service and indicates that Forest Service will monitor
vegetation and track the goats.").
321 Id. at 1153.
32 First, the decision has been unpublished because of the limited precedential value of the ruling
given the fact-specific circumstances that produced the decision. Friends H, 2011 WL 3205773 at "1-2.
Second, the decision is that of a district court in a different circuit (the Ninth) from the circuit at issue
in the Utah controversy (the Tenth), meaning that, at best, the decision is of minimal persuasive
authority. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) ("A decision of a federal district court
judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even
upon the same judge in a different case.").
Third, the decisions of the Ninth Circuit are generally regarded with some skepticism outside
the circuit, given the Supreme Court's perceived hostility towards that circuit. See, e.g., Carol J.
Williams, U.S. Supreme Court Again Rejects Most Decisions by the U.S. 9th Circuit Court ofAppeals, LA.
TiMES (July 18, 2001), http://artides.latimes.com/2011/jul/18/local/a-me-ninth-circuit-scorecard-
20110718 ("It was another bruising year for the liberal judges of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
as the Supreme Court overturned the majority of their decisions, at times sharply criticizing their legal
reasoning... In their reversals, the justices often expressed impatience with what they see as stubborn
refusal by the lower court to follow Supreme Court precedent."); William Peacock, Ninth Battling to
Regain Spot as Most Reversed' Circuit, FINDLAW BLOG (June 11, 2013, 6:03 AM),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/ninth circuit/2013/06/ninth-battling-to-regain-spot-as-most-reversed-
circuit.html ("Lets play a word association game. What are the first things you think of when you hear
'Ninth Circuit'? Liberal. Western. Reversals. The Ninth's reputation precedes it ... "); Robert
Barnes, Supreme Court Reversals Deliver a Dressing-Down to the Liberal 9th Circuit, WASH. POST (Jan.
31, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/artide/2011/01/30/AR2011013113951.html ("In five straight cases, the court has rejected
the work of the San Francisco-based court without a single affirmative vote from ajustice .... 'judicial
disregard is inherent in the opinion[s] of the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.). Fourth, the
district court failed to discuss USFS's statutory obligation to allow the State Fish & Wildlife
Department o manage wildlife in the National Forest. See Friends 1, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1152-1154; 16
U.S.C. § 528 (1960). Fifth, the court relied exclusively upon the regulations themselves without
analyzing USFS's authority to make those regulations. See Friends I, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1152-1154. As
noted above, the application of this regulation to the State seems to conflict with USFS's duty under the
savings clause. Natl Family Planning & Reproductive Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826,
829 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Sixth, the decision--even if good law in all other respects--seems to c nflict with NEPA
precedent like Andrus to the extent that it finds USFS's failure to act under the special use regulation to
be a"major federal action" requiring an EIS. See Friends I, 598 F. Supp 2d at 1153-1154; Defenders of
Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1239-40 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding no major federal action where
federal agency merely fails to prevent State from managing wildlife without consultation or approval of
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IV. (Do WITH THEM) As You LIKE IT: ANALYZING THE AVAILABLE
TOOLS, TECHNIQUES, AND METHODS OF WILDLIFE CONTROL
The starting point of this discussion is, again, that to the extent that
they are not preempted by federal authority, state fish and wildlife agencies
may employ any means available in the exercise of its authority over wildlife
management.35 There are instances in which Congress has issued specific
statutory directives to regulate hunting on federal lands. For example,
hunting in Alaskan National Parks and federal refuges is regulated
pursuant to a statutory mandate explicitly authorizing some amount of
hunting; the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.326 This law
allows for significant state regulation of hunting on federal lands; however,
the National Park Service is now considering taking a more active role in
the direct regulation of these hunting practices.32 7 Among the proposals
put forth by the National Park Service is a codification of the current
temporary ban on certain practices deemed by the National Park Service to
disturb or alter the natural ecosystem.32 Specifically, the National Park
Service has come out against hunting techniques and management
agency, see also Friends 1, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1250 (§ 1732(b) of FLPMS "arguably permits ('may'), but
certainly does not require ('shall'), the Secretary to supersede a state program, and even when he does
so, it must be after consulting state authorities. We are simply unable to read this cautious and limited
permission to intervene in an area of state responsibility and authority as imposing such supervisory
duties on the Secretary that each state action he fails to prevent becomes a 'Federal action.' A state
wildlife-management agency which must seek federal approval for each program it initiates can hardly
be said to have 'responsibility and authority' for its own affairs."). The burden imposed on the Forest
Service by the Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960, codified at 16 § U.S.C. 528 is
substantially similar to § 1732(b) of FLPMA and accordingly, would be analyzed in a similar fashion.
Compare 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (1988), with 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1960).
Finally, the court itself distinguished the case before it in Oregon, at least in part, from the
situation at issue in Utah. Friends I, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1154. In Friends I, the Forest Service relied on
an internal memorandum which opined that "where a state alone proposed introduction of a species
and the proposed introduction was consistent with the governing forest plan.... NEPA
documentation is unnecessary." Id. Distinguishing the Oregon case from this hypothetical, the district
court found that "a great deal of federal-state cooperation is mandated by the Scenic Area Act....
Moreover, the parties dispute whether the Reintroduction Plan as proposed is consistent with the
Scenic Area Plan." Id. That Act, the Scenic Area Act, is not at issue in Utah. This case is one of the
sources of authority the Grand Canyon Trust relies upon in its letter. Letter from Mary O'Brien to
Nora Rasure and Allen Rowley, supra note 224, at 5.
'2' 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1960); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976). Of course, DWR
must do so in compliance with Utah law. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-14-1 (1995). Under Utah law,
DWR is required to consult with the landowner, local government, and the public process (RAC and
Wildlife Board) before taking action. Id.
S ee Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. § 3112 (1980).
327
Regudations, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, ALASKA REGIONAL OFFICE,
http://www.nps.gov/akso/management/regulations.cfm (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
3m See Alaska; Hunting and Trapping in National Preserves, 79 Fed. Reg. 52595, 52595-96
(Sept. 4, 2014).
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practices designed to alter the natural balance between predator and prey
for the purpose of increasing game for human hunters.3 29 This case is an
example of explicit federal authority to regulate hunting. Even in this
instance, however, the National Park Service took action only after
extensive consultation with the state.33 °
The Forest Service and BLM are acting under no such sweeping
federal authorization as the National Park Service.331 Instead, their
authority over the management of wildlife is constrained by both FLPMA
and the Wilderness Act.332 As discussed, the Wilderness Act prohibits only
commercial enterprise, permanent or temporary roads, motor vehicles,
motorized equipment, motorboats, mechanical transport, aircraft landing,
installations, and structures in wilderness areas.333 This provision does not
restrict the exercise of state management authority because, again, §
1133(d)(7) specifically reserves to the States jurisdiction over wildlife
management.334 Furthermore, the structure of the Act would seem to
suggest that the uses described in subsection (d) of § 1133 are exceptions to
the restrictions imposed by the rest of the chapter.33 Therefore, a state may
engage in the activities prohibited in § 1133(c) if necessary to exercise "the
jurisdiction or responsibilities" of that state "with respect to fish and
wildlife. 336
The only statutory exception to state wildlife management authority in
FLPMA is the authorization of the Secretary of the Interior or Agriculture
to close public lands or National Forest System lands to hunting or fishing
"for reasons of public safety, administration, or compliance with provisions
329 
id.
33 Id. Even here, the Park Service could, if it so chose, decline to exercise this authority in favor
of state management. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1239-40 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
331 16 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 2014) (identifying the purpose of National parks to "conserve the
scenery and natural history objects of wildlife therein"); see Natl Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903,
912 (D.D.C. 1986).
332 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7) (2014); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1988).
... § 1133(c).
3- § 1133(d)(7).
331 See § 1133(d) ("The following special provisions are hereby made[.]"); § 1133(d)(1) (allowing
the Secretary of Agriculture to use aircraft for "the control of fire, insects, and diseases" and directing
the Secretary to continue to allow aircraft and motorboats where "these uses have already become
established"); § 1133(d)(5) ("Commercial services may be performed within the wilderness areas
designated by this chapter to the extent necessary for activities which are proper for realizing the
recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas.").
31 § 1133(d)(7); 43 C.F.RL § 24.4(d) (The Department of Interior acknowledged as much when
it stated that "the several States therefore possess primary authority and responsibility for fish and
resident wildlife on Bureau of Land Management Lands."). How could a state exercise "primary
authority" if that authority were continually subject to potential restriction at the hands of BLM? See
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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of applicable law."337 What FLPMA does not allow the Department of the
Interior or Agriculture to do is second-guess the wildlife management
decisions of the States.33 A crucial part of those decisions concern, of
course, the methods employed by the several States to achieve those
goals.339 Barring the imminent destruction of federal land, which the
Forest Service is authorized to prevent,3" there does not appear to be any
federal restriction on the means or methods used to accomplish "the
responsibility and authority of the States for management of fish and
resident wildlife." 3" Any regulation, rule, or policy statement otherwise is
without basis in statute and is, therefore, unenforceable against the State.34
V. CONCLUSION
Each of the several States has the authority to introduce non-native
game species and to manage species on BLM and Forest Service lands,
including Forest Service RNAs and BLM WSAs, in line with the statutory
and regulatory mission of the respective States' Fish and Wildlife
agencies.' Although Congress has broad power to regulate the use,
protection, and management of public lands held by the United States, in
the absence of Congressional mandates otherwise, the several States, in
reality, hold primary wildlife management authority on federal land.3" The
Organic Acts34 and land management statutes34 6 of the various federal land
management agencies recognize and reserve state wildlife management
authority in the majority of circumstances.7
337 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (FLPMA, however, "does not authorize exclusions simply because
hunting and fishing would interfere with resource-management goals."); H.R. REP. No. 94-1724, at 60
(1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175, 6229.
s § 1732(b).
339Andrus, 627 F.2d at 1250 ("A state wildlife-management agency which must seek federal
approval for each program it initiates can hardly be said to have 'responsibility and authority' for its own
affairs."); see also Perkins et al., supra note 22, at 2-4.
3" See Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1928).
41 § 1732(b).
342 See discussion supra Subsection III.B.iii-v.
343 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-14-1 (1995).
" Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976); Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214,
1226-27 (10th Cir. 2002).
5 See 16 U.S.C. § 528 (declaring that State Fish & Wildlife Agencies retain jurisdiction over
wildlife in National Forests); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (regarding BLM-managed land).
16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting the
jurisdiction or responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish in the national
forests.").
34' See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 528 ("Nothing herein shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or
responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish on the national forests."); 43 U.S.C.
§ 1732(b) ("[Nlothing in this Act shall be construed as ... diminishing the responsibility and authority
of the States for management offish and resident wildlife.").
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State authority to manage wildlife, therefore, remains not only
relevant, but is the primary actor managing wildlife on all BLM and Forest
Service-managed lands, including wilderness areas, WSAs, and RNAs.348
The translocation power is as much a part of wildlife management as is the
regulation of hunting and fishing and has been exercised at least into
antiquity.3 49 Since the Forest Service and BLM both lack explicit
Congressional authorization to preempt.. state law as to the translocation
of species on the public lands either agency manages,31' a state may exercise
that authority to introduce any animal, native or non-native,352 on any
federal land where the state has wildlife management authority.35 3 Pursuant
to that authority, a state may exercise its plenary authority to regulate and
manage that species-and any other species the management of which is
not otherwise preempted by federal law-in any manner that the state sees
fit.
354
3 See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b); 36 C.F.R. § 293.10; 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(c).
34 See discussion supra Subsection I.B.iii.
350 See generally NORMANJ. SINGER &J.D. SHAMBLE SINGER, 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTlON § 36:9 (7th ed. 2009).
351 See 16 U.S.C. § 528; § 1133(d)(7); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
352 
See Federal Laws and Regulations, Public Laws andActs, NATL INVASIVE SPECIES INFO.
CENTER, U.S. DEP'" OFAGRIC. (Aug. 26,2014),
http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/laws/publidaws.shtnl.
31 See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,545 (1976) (explaining that in the absence of
contrary federal law regarding wildlife on federal land, "the States have broad trustee and police powers
over wild animals within their jurisdictions.").
35 See discussion supra Part V.
